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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: COMPETING
CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY IN THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE
Erica Beecher-Monas
Domestic violence is all too often the hidden fulcrum cata-
pulting litigants into court,' and far too often it remains a con-
cealed force. Lawyers may fail to raise domestic violence as an
issue, unaware of its impact on their clients' decisions. Judges
may refuse to consider domestic violence, finding it irrelevant
even where it could explain the reasonableness of a defendant's
actions. Although domestic violence may be relevant in many liti-
gation contexts, it is not uniformly admissible, and courts display
an extraordinary reluctance to grapple with its implications. This
is especially apparent in the homicide justification of self-defense.
This article addresses the effects of the courts' failure to rec-
ognize the impact of domestic violence in making evidentiary rul-
ings. Judges frequently misapply evidentiary rules, ignore estab-
lished precedent, and circumvent criteria for scientific validity. I
argue that judges who understand the context and consequences
of domestic violence will make better admissibility decisions with
respect to such testimony. The consequences of unfairly limiting
testimony by mistaken judicial gatekeeping are significant in a
system that strives for justice.
A defining aspect of justice is the requirement of equal
treatment under the law. Equality under the law is far from a
1. The Department of Justice estimates that twenty-two percent of women in federal
prisons and forty-three percent of women in state prisons have been victims of domestic
violence. See Statistics Packet, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women,
Philadelphia, Pa. (3d ed. 1994).
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self-defining concept, however, and much legal debate has focused
on its definition. The law of evidence, no less than other legal
rules, is subject to the debate about what constitutes equality.2
The admissibility of evidence relevant to self-defense for women
who kill in the context of a battering relationship offers a useful
lens through which to view the competing visions.3
This article focuses on three kinds of evidence that surface in
the debate over equality: battered woman syndrome testimony;
testimony about the social context of domestic violence; and post-
traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") evidence. I argue that neither
the goals of formal equality nor those of substantive equality are
being met by the way the evidentiary rules are currently applied
in cases involving domestic violence. On one hand, the goals of
formal equality are not being met in battered woman self-defense
cases because circumstances that are normally admissible in
2. Cf. Mary E. Gale, Unfinished Women: The Supreme Court and the Incomplete Trans-
Formation of Women's Rights in the United States, 9 WHITIER L. RaV. 445, 489 (1987)
(discussing different conceptions of equality subject to debate, including formal equality of
treatment and a perceived need for special treatment).
3. Self-defense is a form of justification and traditionally is explained as an absence of
moral blameworthiness resulting in legal exoneration. Justification defenses exonerate
someone who has killed another human being from criminal consequences. See generally J.
L. AUSTIN, A PLEA FOR ExcusEs (1956). The distinction between justification and excuse is
"between warranted action and unwarranted action for which the actor is not to blame." Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897,
1927 (1984) (arguing that "criminal law should not attempt to distinguish between justifica-
tion and excuse in a fully systematic way"). Professor Greenawalt argues that the distinction
between justification and excuse is incoherent because in both instances the result is legal
exoneration. See id. Some excuses, such as the "heat of passion" or "extreme emotional
disturbance" defenses may result in partial rather than complete exoneration. Although states
differ somewhat in their requirements for self-defense, in general four requirements must be
met: 1) a belief that deadly force is necessary against an imminent threat of death or severe
bodily harm; 2) a proportionate use of force in response to the threat; 3) absence of aggres-
sion on the part of the defendant; and 4) a retreat to the greatest degree reasonably possible.
See generally Marr v. State, 759 A.2d 327, 344 (Md. 2000). The Maryland Pattern Jury
Instructions exemplify this notion, requiring, in pertinent part, that "before using deadly
force, the Defendant is required to make all reasonable effort to retreat. The Defendant does
not have to retreat if the Defendant was in his own home, or retreat was unsafe, or the avenue
to retreat was unknown to the Defendant." Id. (citing Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Maryland
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 4:17.14 at 277.2-.8 (1986 & Supp. 1995). Some states
impose a duty to retreat only when the accused is at fault in provoking the attack. See, e.g.,
Sands v. Commonwealth, 536 S.E. 461, 465 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (drawing a distinction be-
tween justified self-defense, for which no duty to retreat is imposed, and excused self-
defense, for which a duty to retreat to the greatest extent possible is imposed, together with
an announcement by the accused of a desire for peace). Evidence relevant to self-defense
will relate to these factors. Id. at 467.
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male-on-male violence cases become suddenly irrelevant and the
context distorted in female-to-male violence cases." Circum-
stances and context-facets that are commonly admissible in male
violence cases-are frequently excluded.5  On the other hand,
goals of substantive equality are not being met by the special
rules of battered woman syndrome admissibility. Not only do ju-
ries refuse to buy the story battered woman syndrome presents,6
but they cast women in a demeaning light, a light that does not
reflect reality.7
In this article, I contend that the way to resolve the problem
of competing conceptions of equality and provide not only formal
equality, but substantive equality as well, is to expand the courts'
use and appreciation of empiricism.8 Evidence rules invite expert
testimony that would assist the jury in determining a factual is-
sue in the case.9 A crucial factual issue in a self-defense case is
4. See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in
Criminal Cases, 11 Wis. WoMEN's L.J. 75, 79-80 (1996).
5. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 385 (1991).
6. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 86-87 (observing that juries overwhelmingly convict
even where battered woman syndrome testimony is admitted and that those convictions are
overwhelming affirmed on appeal).
7. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and
the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 213, 216 (1992)
(observing that battered woman syndrome simply replaces one stereotype with another).
8. In an important trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court has demanded that judges examine
the empirical basis for statements made by experts in federal courts. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (instructing the federal judiciary to make admissibil-
ity determinations based on analyzing the scientific validity of the proffered testimony, and
on whether the testimony "fits" the issues in the case); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997) (reiterating the trial judge's mandate to review testimony for scientific validity and
"fit"); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the scope of the
Daubert inquiry to technical as well as scientific evidence). The insistence on scientifically
valid testimony to assist factfinding has increasingly been heard in state courts. For example,
even in states which have eschewed the Daubert standard in favor of the old general consen-
sus standard, courts are responding to the pressure to rationalize their decisions by insisting
that expert testimony meet standards of scientific validity. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc.,
705 A.2d 1314, 1323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (reviewing experts' testimony under Frye stan-
dard and addressing scientific validity).
9. FED. R. EviD. 702. Under the Daubert trilogy, however, experts can no longer opine
to "facts" without also demonstrating the basis for their conclusions and the connection be-
tween their conclusions and the methodology they used. See Erica Beecher-Monas, The
Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1563, 1576 (2000). A proper application of this gatekeeping responsibility should serve to
dismantle disabling generalizations about gender such as those used to narrow women's
economic opportunities on the basis of sex-based generalizations. See Linda McClain, To-
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the reasonableness of the accused's conduct under the circum-
stances. Reasonableness can only be assessed with reference to
the parties' relationship to each other and the community at large.
This is the initial insight that impelled legislative and judicial
support for battered woman syndrome testimony.0 The legal jus-
tification of self-defense is based on the idea that survival is a
basic instinct that the state cannot demand be given up.1" The
corollary, however, is that the self-defender must actually believe
that her survival was at stake, and that any reasonable person
knowing what she knew and seeing what she saw would similarly
believe that it was necessary to act in self-defense or die. Thus,
in order to activate the justification, the defendant cannot have
had any reasonable alternatives to acting in self-defense.
To decide whether there were viable alternatives (or whether
a reasonable person would have thought there were), one must
ward a Formative Project of Securing Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV., 1221,
1246 (2000). I am not suggesting that experts will not differ about their conclusions (or their
methodology, for that matter), but that they can no longer assert unsubstantiated conclusions.
See generally Beecher-Monas, supra.
10. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §1107 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001) (expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome admissible to show not only the effects of domestic violence on
beliefs and perceptions, but also on the "behavior of victims" of domestic violence); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-41-1-3.3, 35-41-3-11 (Michie 1998) (providing a procedural framework
for using the "effects of battery" as evidence either "that the defendant was not responsible as
a result of mental disease or defect" under the insanity statute or to claim that she "used justi-.
fiable reasonable force" under the law of self-defense); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033.19 (West
1999) ("Evidence that the actor was suffering from the battered spouse syndrome shall be
admissible upon the issue of whether the actor lawfully acted in self-defense or defense of
another."); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-203(b) (Michie 1999) ("If a... person raises the affirma-
tive defense of self-defense, the person may introduce expert testimony that the person suf-
fered from [battered woman] syndrome, to establish the necessary requisite belief of an im-
minent danger of death or great bodily harm as an element of the affirmative defense, to
justify the person's use of force."); People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 & n.3 (Cal. 1996)
(acknowledging that "expert testimony on domestic violence refers to more than a woman's
psychological reactions to violence" and should be admissible to explain the objective rea-
sonableness of her conduct); Bonner v. State, 740 So. 2d 439, 440-41 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)
(battered woman syndrome allowed to explain conduct and coping mechanisms of battered
women); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C. 1986) (expert testimony relating battered
women's syndrome to defendant's state of mind is critical to establishing self-defense).
11. This insight has some scientific justification, since researchers have determined that
the survival instinct has a genetic basis, and therefore we are in some sense "programmed"
for it. See Marcia Barinaga, From Fruit Flies, Rats, Mice: Evidence of Genetic Influence,
Sci., June 17, 1994, at 1690 (acknowledging that "[b]ehavioral researchers have realized for
decades that animal behaviors [such as] survival instincts and mating rituals ... are at least
partly under genetic control").
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understand what the alternatives were. Because the common ex-
perience of jurors (or judges, for that matter) does not encompass
knowledge about domestic violence and the paucity of escape
routes open to its victims, expert testimony may be necessary to
assist them in their decisions. Widespread misconceptions about
the prevalence and circumstances of domestic violence mean that
expert testimony about the demographics of domestic violence; its
frequency; its under-reporting; the incidence of women killed in
attempting to separate from abusive intimates; and the ineffec-
tiveness of escape routes (including paucity of community support,
police and justice responses to victims seeking assistance), would
indeed assist the jury.12  In addition, for a subset of women who
were not only subjected to domestic violence, but who also suf-
fered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the abuse,
expert testimony should be admissible to explain their actions.
This testimony, however, should be limited to scientifically sound
information.
In Part I of this Article, I examine competing conceptions of
equality, discussing notions of formal and substantive equality,
and suggesting that although both visions offer insights into the
goals of justice, there is a strong need for a transcending vision.
In Part II, I discuss the theoretical basis for the justification of
12. For a description of the depth of public misconceptions about domestic violence, see
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 10-13 (1991) (arguing that denial about the existence and prevalence of
domestic violence is so prevalent that even woman that have experienced abuse often deny
that they were battered women). The relevance and helpfulness of such testimony is not a
new idea. See, e.g., Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of
Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987) (arguing that expert testimony about
social frameworks are used to "construct a frame of reference or background context for
deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case"). See also Myrna S.
Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome By and
Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 790-95
(1996) (advocating expert testimony to educate the jury about the social context of domestic
violence). Unlike Walker and Monahan, I do not believe that jury instructions will suffi-
ciently solve the problem of dispelling juror misconceptions. See Walker & Monahan, supra,
at 585-88. Rather, I agree with Orenstein, who suggests that relevant background informa-
tion regarding social context should be readily admissible by both prosecution and defense.
See Aviva Orenstein, No More Bad Men! A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in
Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 707 (1998) (arguing that expert testimony about demo-
graphic and social information should be admissible in rape trials). I would add the caveat
that such social context evidence must meet standards not only of relevance and helpfulness
articulated in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but must also meet the Daubert
requirements for scientific validity. See infra pp. 115-17.
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self-defense, and note that liberal and relational theories of hu-
man nature are similarly limited. Part III discusses the formal
equality goals focusing on basic evidentiary concepts in battered
women's self-defense cases. Part IV discusses judicial and legis-
lative attempts to remedy the perceived short-comings of the for-
mal equality evidentiary regime through battered woman syn-
drome testimony. This Part contends that battered woman syn-
drome fails to achieve the substantive equality that was its goal,
and cannot meet criteria for scientific validity. Part V contends
that the impetus for permitting battered woman syndrome testi-
mony is the perceived need for social context testimony in bat-
tered women's self-defense cases, and suggests that a better way
to achieve fairness goals is to divide battered women's syndrome
testimony into its two valid component parts-social context and
post-traumatic stress disorder evidence-while discarding the
invalid syndrome testimony. Permitting experts to educate the
jury about the social context of domestic violence-that is, the
sources, prevalence, and responses to domestic violence-permits
the accused to demonstrate the reasonableness of her conduct,
allows for the correction of mistaken assumptions that may lead
to incorrect conclusions," gives voice to the complexity of social
inter-relationships,"4  and mitigates the marginalization of
women's reality.5 Permitting testimony about post-traumatic
stress disorder permits the accused to explain the honesty of her
perceptions and the reasonableness of her conduct.
13. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984) (expert social context testimony
about battered women admissible as "an area where the purported common knowledge of the
jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn from their own experi-
ence, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would
enable the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as being common myths rather than
common knowledge").
14. See McClain, Formative Project, supra note 9, at 1222-23 (calling for a "formative
project" in constitutional theory that would recognize the "interplay between independence
and dependency, and between personal and public responsibility" and noting that this project
will require "various types of empirical inquiry and call for normative judgment").
15. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 Wis. WcMEN's L.J. 149, 150 (2000).
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I. COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY
The guarantee of equal protection under the law6 is often ex-
plained as requiring that similarly situated people be treated
similarly. This begs some obvious questions. What is similar
treatment, and who are similarly situated people? What does it
mean that women are entitled to the same rights as men? Do
gender differences make people differently situated, or should the
same charge-homicide, for example-trigger the same rules
across genders? Or should the goal rather be to achieve similar
treatment? Is it necessary to recognize gender differences "to as-
sure women fully equal legal status with men?" 7 The answers to
these questions form the basis of competing visions of equality.
Conceptions of formal equality require that judges apply
rules of law in the same way to men and women and assume that
everyone subject to the rules is in fundamentally the same posi-
tion, regardless of gender. 8 Proponents of formal equality insist
that equal treatment under the law requires evidentiary rules to
apply in a neutral, gender-blind manner. Thus, in the context of
homicide, women who kill must be subject to the same rules and
use the same defenses as do men who kill. Any other result, ar-
gue proponents of this approach, gives women a "license to kill."9
The critique of the formal equality approach centers on two
factors. First, some critics argue that the criminal law paradigm
is a male-violence .paradigm with little application to women's
lives. 0 Second, some critics contend that even the traditional
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating equal protection).
17. Adelaide H. Villmoare, Feminist Jurisprudence and Political Vision, 24 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 443, 450 (1999).
18. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY
OF DIVORCE REFORM 3 (1991) (discussing competing conceptions of equality).
19. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB
STORIES AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1994) (asserting that "legal tactic[s] by which
criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation.., is quickly
becoming a license to kill").
20. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA.
L. REV.. 2151, 2151 (1995) (arguing that "criminal law is, from top to bottom, preoccupied
with male concerns and male perspectives" and that "sometimes equality cannot be achieved
by treating two groups of people the same way").
20011
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male-oriented rules are not evenly applied to women.21 To rem-
edy these shortcomings, these critics maintain that a focus on
substantive equality is necessary.
Substantive equality insists that the legitimacy of any legal
action depends on its consequences.22 Proponents of substantive
equality argue that even where rules are applied evenly across
genders, the results of applying such gender-neutral rules may
actually perpetuate unequal results." Inequality in relationships
among people may require different treatment for different gen-
ders for people of different genders to end up in the same posi-
tion.' Proponents of result-oriented rules argue that women and
men are in fundamentally different situations, have different per-
ceptions and different needs, and that these situations must be
taken into account in any system of justice.25 This is the impetus
21. See, e.g., Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 383; Parrish,
supra note 4, at 78-79.
22. This is fundamentally a utilitarian position, which emphasizes consequences over
means. Although feminists may argue for substantive equality, utilitarianism has been advo-
cated by such diverse liberal philosophers as John Stuart Mill and Richard Posner. See, e.g.,
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 74
(1910) (noting that individuals submit to external control only to the extent that it results in
the collective good); Richard Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of
Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 187 n.2 (admitting he is a "constrained utilitarian" with the
goal of wealth maximization rather than equality).
23. See Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 383.
24. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.
J. 1373 (1986) (advocating that law be created from the constantly changing differences
among people). The famous language of Carolene Products footnote four arguably endorsed
such a principle, suggesting that heightened scrutiny should be applied to laws affecting
"discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938). This theory stresses the idea that "culture and social practice subordinate women
under laws that are formally neutral." See Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 2152.
25. Some scholars argue, for example, that danger is different for men and women. See
Elizabeth M. Schneider et al., Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves, in
WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 4 (Elizabeth Bochnak ed., 1981)
(arguing that "due to a variety of societally-based factors, a woman may reasonably perceive
imminent and lethal danger in a situation in which a man might not"). See also Robert F.
Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between
Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 98 (1994) (discussing the requirement of a
reasonable belief of danger). The Model Penal Code requires only a belief in the necessity of
deadly force (rather than a reasonable belief), but the circumstances the defendant knows in
forming that belief are equally important here. See id. at 98-104 (proposing that "criminal
defenses must provide the conceptual structure needed to evaluate reasonableness, under-
standability, and culpability independently" and limiting self-defense to actual necessity with
a separate excuse for mistaken necessity). Men's and women's reasonable perceptions of and
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for statutes and court rules permitting battered woman syndrome
testimony, for example, based on the perception that gender-
neutral legal rules have systematically excluded women's expla-
nations.2  The critique of the substantive equality approach cen-
ters on the slippery slope of applying different standards to indi-
viduals ina melting pot society, where the conduct at issue is vir-
tually the same.27 If different types of people are subjected to dif-
ferent standards by virtue of their group membership, the argu-
ment goes, then the common political culture is weakened.2' An-
other criticism of the substantive equality approach is that it may
backfire on the voiceless group, emphasizing stereotypes and de-
monizing the minority.
Although both formal and substantive equality paradigms
have insights-and both have flaws-neither is sufficient. Using
the insights of both formal and substantive equality, however, and
insisting on substantiated, empirically-based argument, tran-
scends these limitations.29 What I am suggesting is that courts
demand, as they are invited to demand by the Supreme Court's
responses to such danger also differ. See Schopp et al., supra, at 98-104. Therefore, immi-
nent danger and proportionate force may also be very different between the sexes. See id.
26. See West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 15, at 150.
27. Of course, the female half of the population hardly qualifies as a "melting pot," but the
argument is that if you use special rules for women, you must use them for other minorities
(and hence, the slippery slope). For an excellent discussion of the "cultural defense" argu-
ments, see Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multi-
culturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 96-
98 (1995) (concluding that social context evidence ought to be freely admissible in criminal
trials on behalf of both prosecution and defense whenever state of mind is at issue because
accommodating "the voices of overlapping groups of outsiders does not require hearing one
group while silencing another").
28. See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 Sw. U. L. REV.
171, 186 (1999) (contending that battered woman syndrome testimony, by creating "different
standards for different types of persons . . . lessens the possibility of a common political
culture to which a citizen can belong").
29. I call this vision the empirical approach, but by empirical I do not mean that facts exist
without value. See McClain, Formative Project, supra note 9, at 1230 (arguing that it is "a
dangerous dead end" to think empirical sciences can avoid normative judgment, not only
because "gender-role expectations will color scientists' "findings" about the sexes" but be-
cause "the risk exists of blurring the distinction between 'is' and 'ought' and of not simply
explaining, but excusing or legitimating men's recourse to such 'adaptive' and 'rational'
tactics as rape, confining and policing women's sexuality, domestic violence, and sexual
harassment"). On the contrary, theory permeates every level of factual inquiry. See
Beecher-Monas, supra note 9, at 1576 (noting that "scientific conclusions are based on sub-
jective judgments made at key points ranging from the initial decision to study a particular
phenomenon through the collection, categorization, and interpretation of data").
20011
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transformative trilogy of scientific evidence cases, s3 empirical sup-
port for the assertions that are made in their courtrooms, and
admit, as they are required to admit under the rules of evidence,
expert testimony that would be helpful to the jury in resolving an
issue in the case. 1 This is an argument that sound decisionmak-
ing be based on empirical knowledge rather than speculation,32
and that judges reanimate the law, actuating existing legal doc-
trine33 and permit the jury to hear the necessity arguments in the
claims of battered women who kill in self-defense.
Self-defense is a justification to homicide because, under
both liberal and relational approaches, self-preservation is an
important value. This value also has some biological basis, be-
cause the survival instinct is demonstrably present in all biologi-
cal organisms.34 The limitation is that survival of the accused
must really have been at stake-as close as we can tell-that her
30. The Supreme Court's transformative trilogy of evidentiary cases consists of Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593-94 (instructing the federal judiciary to make admissibility determinations
based on analyzing the scientific validity of the proffered testimony and on whether the tes-
timony "fits" the issues in the case); Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142 (reiterating the trial judge's man-
date to review testimony for scientific validity and "fit"); and Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at
158 (extending the scope of the Daubert inquiry to technical as well as scientific evidence).
31. FED. R. EviD. 702.
32. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Rumi-
nations on the Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 661, 671 (2000) (arguing that the Daubert trilogy emphasizes the importance of using
valid empirical knowledge rather than unsubstantiated empirical speculation as the basis of
decisionmaking).
33. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 477,
488-89 (1996) (arguing that patterns of domestic violence be taken outside the family con-
text, and placed in a public framework of torture, terrorism, kidnapping and human rights).
34. See N. Hughes-Jones, Inter-Group Aggression: The Multi-Individual Organism and
the Survival Instinct, 16 INDEX MEDICuS 231, Apr.-Jun. 2000. I am not arguing that it is
permissible to "commit the naturalistic fallacy and slip.., from explanation to justification."
See McClain, Formative Project, supra note 9, at 1231 n.41. The fact that evolutionary bi-
ologists may be able to explain male aggression against females as an evolutionary adaptation
does not mean that the law should encourage such aggression. Evolutionary biology may be
able to explain the prevalence of a trait, and perhaps offer some suggestions for effective
means to control an undesirable adaptation, but it says little about the prescriptive. For ex-
ample, color-blindness may have been an adaptive mechanism, but it does not tell us any-
thing about whether we should act to prevent it. For that we must turn to consciousness, that
"curious ability we humans have of construction, not just the mental patterns of an object-
the images of persons, places, melodies, and of their relationships, in short, the temporally
and spatially integrated mental images of something-to-be-known-but also the mental
patterns which convey, automatically and naturally, the sense of a self in the act of knowing."
ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS 11 (1999).
[Vol. 47
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conduct must have been necessary for her self-preservation.35 In
order to determine that, the context of the relationship between
the batterer and the accused is important (and will be the subject
of lay witness testimony). This relationship did not exist in a vac-
uum, however, but within a broader social realm. 6 Thus, when
reasonableness of a party's conduct is at issue, as it is in self-
defense, this means that the story must be told with enough of the
background for the jury to make the required factual evaluation. 7
Expert testimony can provide that background, demonstrating the
interdependence of the individuals involved with their larger soci-
ety, a foundational insight of communitarian theorists." This ex-
pert testimony must be scientifically valid to be helpful, but the
jury cannot be left without guidance as to its significance. Thus,
scientifically valid expert testimony must be combined with jury
instructions linking the relevance of the testimony to the legal
standards that must be met.
35. Because of the difficulty of assessing necessity in hindsight, the ordinary person stan-
dard is a proxy for the actuality. The question is, therefore, not whether it was really a kill-
or-be-killed situation, but whether a reasonable person would have thought it to be so under
the circumstances that then existed.
36. See, e.g., Renee RLimkens, Ambiguous Responsibilities: Law and Conflicting Expert
Testimony on the Abused Woman Who Shot Her Sleeping Husband, 25 LAW & SOC. INQ. 355,
363 n.4 (2000) (arguing that although "no general sociological analysis of the problem of
wife abuse and its impact can provide valid, standard answers to individual cases .... it is
vital to provide a valid context in which to interpret individual responses"); cf Orenstein, No
More Bad Men, supra note 12, at 707 (advocating the use of expert testimony to educate the
jury about the social background of rape).
37. Professor Maguigan argues that social context evidence should be available to explain
the reasonableness of self-defense in situations where the defendant comes from a different
culture and that expert testimony should similarly be available to the prosecution for im-
peachment purposes. See generally Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence, supra
note 27, at 36. I agree with Professor Maguigan on this, as it accommodates both formal
equality (because, among other things, expert testimony is available to both sides) and sub-
stantive equality (because people whose experience.is radically different from the norm are
not treated as though they magically assumed the attributes of the dominant culture) and
transcends them both by exposing the underlying assumptions and insisting on factual basis
for argumentation. Evidence alone is not enough, however, and jury instructions linking the
testimony to the legal standards must be given. See infra Section V.A.
38. See, e.g., MARTHA MIN oW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 277-78 (1990)
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IX. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF SELF-DEFENSE
EVIDENCE
The justification of self-defense reflects a moral entitlement
to repel wrongful violence where there is no viable alternative. 9
The liberal philosophy upon which this idea is based conceives an
original state of nature where life was a war of each against all,
until "men" entered into a social contract in which the state (and
the rule of law) replaced the necessity of war.4 Under this atom-
istic view of human nature, the state-and the rights it enforces-
is the antidote to war."' From a liberal/atomistic view of human
nature, the self-defense justification for homicide reflects the idea
that when someone attacks us and there are no alternatives to
facing the danger, avoiding death or severe bodily harm is the
right thing to do, even at the cost of another's life.4 For example,
Spinoza thought that the effort to preserve oneself is the founda-
39. See Arthur Ripstein, Self-Defense and Equal Protection, 57 U. Pir. L. REV. 685,
685-86 (1996) (noting that one is expected to utilize two "alternatives to murder: getting out
of harm's way or invoking the protection of the state" and that the law of self-defense is the
embodiment of that idea).
40. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POUTICS 70-71 (1984) (describing
liberal political theory regarding the origins and purpose of the state as "the circumstances of
reciprocal hostility and need, and the universal interest in comfort and glory, [which] carry
implications of their own for how society ought to be arranged" and pointing out that "natural
rights conceptions [contain] an ambiguity that obscures a fatal dilemma" in that they cannot
answer the question of "how objective standards can be inferred from facts" or "how to go
about judging divergence" from ends like peace and prosperity or what happens when the
result of applying the rights is contrary to the sought-for ends).
41. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 276 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (explaining that "Civil Government is the Proper Remedy for the
Inconveniences of the State of Nature ... where Men may be Judges in their own Case").
42. As Seventeenth Century philosopher Thomas Hobbes explained the basis for the right
of self-defense, "no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation." THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 232 (Edwin Curley ed., 1958) (1651). See Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1998) ("An
actor pleading justification claims to have acted properly, that she did the right thing."). This
is distinguished from excuse, which may also exculpate the defendant-or mitigate the of-
fense-in which the defendant "admits that what she did was wrong, but claims that some
characteristic or her condition leaves her blameless for the offense." Id.
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tion of virtue.43 It is hard to imagine a more male vision than the
notion of the origin of the state as an antidote to war."
An alternative vision is that of connectedness,45 in which
law's purpose is to maintain community and connection.' A
mother, for example, might risk her own life to save one of her
children. Rather than exalting "rights over responsibilities, sepa-
rateness over connection, and the individual over the commu-
nity[," 47 the communitarian emphasizes "the democratic remak-
ing of social life.' From a relational perspective, we should
choose legal strategies that implement fully equal citizenship. In
order to do this the law should "protect good forms of connection
and to protect against harmful forms of connection."'
Contrary to the liberal philosopher's insistence on neutral
and rational rules as the most likely to achieve just results, rela-
tional scholars argue that the consequences of the rules are any-
43. B. SPINOZA, THE ETmcs, Part IV, Proposition 22 (1982) (1677). Indeed, Damasio
claims that, rather than virtue, the instinct for self-preservation is the foundation of con-
sciousness. See DAMASIO, supra note 34, at 25.
44. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1988)
(arguing that our entire system of jurisprudence is based on the entirely male concept of the
separateness of individuals and that a feminist jurisprudence would be founded on connect-
edness).
45. See UNGER, supra note 40, at 71.
46. The liberal view of the state is criticized by some feminists, who argue that it is "inex-
tricably masculine in its model of separate, atomistic, competing individuals establishing a
legal system to pursue their own interests and'to protect them from others' interference with
their rights to do so." Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic" Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connec-
tion, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1173 (1992). By using the term
"feminist," I do not mean to imply a monolithic theory. There are many kinds of feminists,
some of whom disagree with each other. Nonetheless, the desire to address and eliminate the
subordination of women is a common aspiration, as is the goal of empowering women's
experiences. See Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis
into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect it, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 221, 228 (1999)
(describing different feminist approaches and articulating a common ground). In addition,
there are liberal feminists who believe that the goals of formal equality--equal application of
legal rules-are worthy aspirations. See, e.g., ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLTlCS AND
HUMAN NATURE 175-85 (1998).
47. McClain, Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 46, at 1174.
48. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 109 (1986).
49. See DONALD A. DOWNS, MORE THAN VIcTIMs: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME
SOcIETY, AND THE LAW 186-94 (1996) (castigating the use of battered women's syndrome
testimony because it undermines notions of equal citizenship).
50. McClain, Formative Project, supra note 9, at 1238 (citing ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR
JUSTICE 94-95 (1997)).
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thing but just to half of humanity.51 The liberal view, forming the
dominant discourse of our legal system, ignores the dominant ex-
perience for half of humanity, the experience of connectedness.52
To give that experience "voice," relational feminists argue that
legal rules must accommodate the inequalities and interdepend-
ence of human beings. 3 One way of putting this is that "women
suffer in ways that men do not, and that the gender-specific suf-
fering that women endure is routinely ignored or trivialized in the
larger (male) legal culture."54 Women's stories about the reason-
ableness of their conduct need to be heard.
In order to accomplish this task, legal doctrine must accom-
modate the "interplay between human agency and social struc-
ture."55 At the very least, if the consequences of legal rules disad-
vantage women over men, the rules ought to be changed." This
51. See Orenstein, Apology Excepted, supra note 46, at 222 (observing that the "Federal
Rules of Evidence exude confidence that the rules are neutral and rational, and as such, mostlikely to achieve fair and socially useful results" while in reality, "evidence rules are not
neutral or objective. . .[are] laden with cultural biases ... [and] as a practical matter .... may
discriminate against the cognitive and linguistic styles of women and other subordinate
groups"); see also MiNow, supra note 38, at 19 (arguing that neutral rules and abstractions
"hide under claims of universality what is in fact the particular point of view and experience
of those in power").
52. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 3 (1997) (arguing that because rights notions
and the legal rules that embody them are based on this fundamentally flawed and one-sided
view of human nature, women are not protected by the law). Connectedness is also thedominant experience for all of humanity at one time or another, although this insight is too
often ignored in a patriarchal legal system.
53. See DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 309 (1989) (relational feminist workinsists that women's communitarian values be implemented); Linda Ross Meyer, Unruly
Rights, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (discussing communitarian theorists as castigating
liberal rights which "falsely separate us from each other as individuals and create anomie and
a false sense of self-reliance, papering over real need, interdependence, and inequality with
the legal fiction of equal rights"). Cf. Romkens, supra note 36, at 382 (discussing the Nether-lands conviction of an abused woman convicted of murdering her spouse" as a consequence
of the law's tendency to initially disqualify women's day-to-day experiences as legally ir-
relevant").
54. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 15, at 150 (arguing that
women's injuries are not recognized by the legal system and that one of the prime ways in
which a woman's injuries are discounted as deserved or private is the context of domestic
violence).
55. See McClain, Formative Project, supra note 9, at 1235 (contending that any systemhoping to achieve gender equality must "pay heed to the multiple and overlapping forms of
disadvantage and discrimination that women suffer").
56. Cf. RHODE, supra note 53, at 318 (arguing the necessity of "refocusing conventional
legal doctrine from gender difference to gender disadvantage"); Ripstein, supra note 39, at685 (contending that "the criminal law's aim [is one] of treating people as equals by protect-
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relational vision requires a reconceptualizing of society so that it
is understood that--contrary to liberal philosophy-the public
(market) and the private (family) spheres are not separate. They
overlap in every area."
Liberal theorists are not alone in seeing self-preservation as
an integral facet of human existence. Self-preservation (or the
preservation of one's children) is an important concern even if
one's perspective is communitarian. The principle of self-
preservation is not unlimited, under either a liberal or a commu-
nitarian perspective. Only "actions undertaken against one who
is himself the source of the threat to one's survival"--or the sur-
vival of one's children-should be protected"8 under either theory.
In essence, the concept of self-defense is that people "who are un-
able to use ordinary remedies are entitled to extraordinary reme-
dies because of the extraordinary circumstances in which they
find themselves." 9 The law reflects--or ought to reflect-an allo-
cation of risks between the accused, who should be protected
against only unreasonable threats, and the attacker, who should
be exposed only to reasonable responses to his attack.60
Thus, a corollary of the right to preserve one's life or bodily
integrity is the idea that it must be necessary to do so.61 That is,
ing them equally" and that "pervasive inequalities cannot be ignored if the law is to claim that
it is fair").
57. See RHODE, supra note 53, at 318-19 (discussing the overlap of public and private
spheres and contending that broad social changes are required before equal treatment can be
implemented).
58. Claire 0. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PIrr. L. REv. 621, 640
(1996) (arguing that battered woman cases where the batterer was killed during a lull in the
violence can best be analyzed under the rubric of rational excuse). A further limitation is the
requirement that the defendant cannot have initiated the aggression, and that the force used to
repel the attack be. no greater than necessary. See, for example, New York's formulation,
requiring for justification that the self-defender "reasonably believes that such other person
using or about to use deadly force .. " N.Y. [PENAL LAw] 35.15(2) (McKinney 1987). The
Model Penal Code inserts a general reasonableness requirement for a complete defense. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (1985) (proscribing justification if the actor's belief in neces-
sity is reckless or negligent).
59. Ripstein, supra note 39, at 685.
60. See id. at 691-92 (advocating that the risks should be allocated by "protecting the
accused against unreasonable threats, and exposing the attacker only to reasonable self-
defense").
61. See Melissa Wheatcroft, Note, Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants-in New Jersey, a
Battered Spouse's Home Is Not Her Castle, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 543 (1999) (explaining the
history of self-defense and reflecting that the merger of two prongs of justified homicides,
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there must be no other alternative to the use of force in self-
defense. From a communitarian perspective, one cannot ignore
the inter-relationship of family and economics, and the fear,
domination and control that are a common experience of women.62
When the necessity argument surfaces, ' as it does in questions
about why a victim of domestic violence did not leave the relation-
ship, and whether she had a duty to retreat from her home during
an altercation, it is imperative to bring the larger social context
into the picture.
Both visions of society, the liberal and the relational, have
consequences for law.63 The way legal rules are justified depends
upon the justifications one views as legitimate. Arguments about
necessity illustrate this dichotomy, and are important foundations
for the defense: if the judge does not perceive the accused's re-
sponse as reasonably necessary, no evidence of self-defense will
be admitted and no jury instruction given. Further, evidence law
is particularly important because it shapes legal discourse about
credibility and reason."
III. FoRMAL EQUALITY: THE ARGUMENT FOR NEUTRAL RULES
The goal of formal equality proponents is to include battered
women, like all criminal defendants, within the traditional
framework of the criminal law in order to guarantee their equal
rights to trial."65 The argument is that if legal rules were really
one of which permitted homicides if there was no reasonable alternative, and one which
permitted self-protection to prevent a felony, resulted in current self-defense doctrine which
requires necessity and retreat). Cf. Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality
and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 1,
38 (1999) (noting that at early common law, most felonies were punishable by death, so
permitting deadly force to prevent a felony was explained as the felon having forfeited his
right to life, but that with the creation of statutory felonies with lower sanctions the rationale
has disappeared).
62. West, Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 15, at 150.
63. See Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer, supra note 28, at 178 (explaining that while
liberalism views law as a collection of neutral rules and principles, feminism sees law as an
intrinsically cultural "set of social practices" that "reflects, affects, and instantiates patriarchal
culture").
64. See id. at 180 (remarking that evidence law "helps to craft our conceptions about
credibility and reason").
65. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 114 (2000)(arguing that formal equality models of analysis should be predicated not on the sameness of
men and women but on the different circumstances in which they find themselves).
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neutral, and if they were really applied in an even-handed man-
ner, equality goals (justice, for example) would be met." Thus, in
order to meet the aspirations of formal equality-that neutral
rules should be applied in an even-handed manner-women who
assert self-defense to homicide ought to be subject to the same
evidentiary rules applied in the same way as men who kill.67 One
prominent feminist critique is that new self-defense rules are un-
necessary for battered women; the impediment to fairness is that
existing rules are not applied in an even-handed manner." So
what are the self-defense rules, and how are they being applied to
battered women who kill?
Despite differences in phrasing, self-defense in most jurisdic-
tions requires proof of the following four elements: reasonable
belief that force is necessary against an imminent threat of harm;
use of proportionate force in responding to the threatened harm;
absence of aggression on the part of the defendant; and retreat to
the greatest degree reasonably possible.69 Evidence to support
each of these elements must meet the admissibility criteria of the
court in order to be considered by the factfinder. The evidentiary
framework thus determines which of the elements will be prov-
able in court, and consequently, whether the defendant will be
exonerated from criminal culpability.0
66. See FINEMAN, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing competing conceptions of equality and
concluding that rules are neither neutral nor applied evenly).
67. This apparently is the position of Alan Dershowitz. See, e.g., DERSHOWrIZ, supra note
19, at 3.
68. See, e.g., Schneider, Resistance to Equality, supra note 33, at 490 ("cases involving
battered women who kill fall within traditional frameworks of defenses or excuses, but are
nonetheless viewed as different or exceptional by judges who apply the law to these cases");
Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 383 ("the most common
impediments to fair trials for battered women are the result not of the structure or content of
existing law, but of its application by trial judges").
69. See Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat Where Assailant and
Assailed Share the Same Living Quarters, 67 A.L.R. 5th 637, 657 (1999) some courts also
require evidence of an overt act of aggression on the part of the deceased. See Parrish, supra
note 4, at 112. (citing Indiana and Ohio). The Model Penal Code provides that "the use of
force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force
by the other person on the present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985).
70. I will be discussing the evidentiary framework throughout this article in terms of the
federal rules. The Federal Rules of Evidence have been adopted by the majority of the states
and are thus relevant to the discussion of self-defense even though most cases are decided
under state law. Cf 1 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EvIDENCE iN AMERICA
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Although the prosecution must prove that the accused did
not kill in self-defense,71 the judge must be convinced that a prima
facie case of self-defense72 had been made before expert testimony
relevant to self-defense will be admitted or the jury charged with
a self-defense instruction.73  The trial court will neither permit
testimony nor provide instructions to the jury unless it first de-
termines that the circumstances warrant it.74 But in assessing
whether self-defense testimony should be admitted or jury charge
given, domestic violence is often ignored.75 Judges, defense coun-
xxv (1994) (noting that 36 states adopted rules of evidence modeled on the Federal Rules by
December 31, 1993).
71. See Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (discussing
the burden of proof on prosecution).
72. In order to make out a prima facie case of self-defense, there must. be some factual
evidence that the elements of self-defense are present. That means, essentially, that before
any expert testimony will be allowed, the defendant (or another lay witness) will have to
testify to the facts that make up the claim.
73. Evidence is admissible in relation to something that must be proved or disproved at
trial. Evidence proffered to show self-defense must be "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. Evm. 401. This
broad rule of relevance is tempered by the limitation of the unfair prejudice doctrine that may
operate to exclude even relevant evidence. FED. R. EviD. 403 provides that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EviD. 403. This is a balancing test, requiring the court to weigh the probative value
against the danger of unfair prejudice, generally by way of emotional appeals. Undue preju-
dice is explained by the advisory committee's notes as "an undue tendency to suggest deci-
sion on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." FED. R.
EviD. 403 advisory committee's note. Professor Orenstein points out that the devaluing of
emotion as a proper basis for decision pervades the Federal Rules of Evidence. Orenstein,
Apology Excepted, supra note 46, at 224 (applying feminist method to examine how evidence
rules "reflect the sexual power and social dynamics in our culture" and how the rules under-
represent women and ignore their insights). See also Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer,
supra note 28, at 217 (making a distinction between "rational" and "irrational" emotions and
contending that because "[e]motions are a central part of our moral and social judgments"
they must inform sound reasoning).
74. See, e.g., Sands v. Commonwealth, 536 S.E.2d 461, 464 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (revers-
ing the trial court's refusal to give a self-defense charge due to the trial court's perception
that there was no evidence of self-defense--even though the deceased had battered the ac-
cused for years, had held her hostage in her home on the day of the incident, and had threat-
ened that he intended to kill her-because the accused shot her husband during a lull in the
fighting).
75. See, e.g., State v. Head, 622 N.W.2d 9, 11-14 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (narrowing the
time-line for imminence to the morning of the shooting and affirming exclusion of domestic
violence evidence and refusal to instruct jury on self--defense, where accused could show
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sel and prosecution are all implicated in ignoring the significance
of domestic violence. 6
A. Reasonable Belief That Force Is Necessary Against Im-
minent Threat of Harm
Proximity of threatened harm is required for self-defense in
every jurisdiction." The foundational idea is that self-defensive
conduct must be necessary for self-preservation.7" Necessity is
central to arguments about imminence and reasonableness.79 The
liberal view of the basis for the imminence requirement is that
"when an attack against private individuals is imminent, the po-
lice are no longer in a position to intervene and exercise the
only that on the morning in question, the decedent had been lying in bed, threatened to "take
care of you guys" and "whipped the covers aside and rolled across with his fist" because
there was no specific threat against the accused and the threat was "not accompanied by
violence at that time").
76. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, supra note 33, at 502 & n.96 (citing cases). See
also People v. Bolden, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 111, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000 ) (affirming exclusion
of evidence that accused had suffered injuries at the hands of the deceased because it saw the
situation as mutual combat, and "[tihere are many explanations for bruises and even for a
black eye."); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474 (Nev. 2000) (reversing and remanding because
trial court failed to properly instruct that evidence related to battering should be considered
for evidence of defendant's state of mind); Commonwealth v. Singh, 582 A.2d 1312, 1313
(Pa. 1990) (Zappala, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority's refusal to hear appeal was
mistaken because by failing to request jury instructions linking testimony about domestic
violence to self-defense, "the jury was never given guidance as to the legal significance of
the history of abuse ... [and] was required to address the relevance of the husband's prior
acts of violence against the Appellant in a vacuum"); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555
A.2d 772, 785 (Pa. 1989) (failure to request jury instruction linking experience of domestic
violence to self-defense is ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. McFadden,
587 A.2d 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (remanding for ineffective assistance of counsel where,
despite evidence of domestic violence, counsel failed to ask for a self-defense instruction).
77. The Model Penal Code, for example, provides that "the use of force.., is justifiable
when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary ... on the present occa-
sion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1) (1985). There appears to be some difference in the
way courts interpret "immediate" and "imminent" in that "states that define the harm threat-
ened as imminent are more likely than those requiring immediacy to receive expert testimony
on the theory that it is relevant to the jury's assessment of the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's judgment about the proximity of the harm threatened." Parrish, supra note 4, at 120.
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 2 ("Prevailing rules respecting self-defense, both
common law and statutory, similarly demanded belief in the necessity of the defensive ac-
tion.").
79. Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Abusers,
71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 405 (1993).
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state's function of securing public safety." ° This liberal concept is
often translated into a temporal requirement because temporal
imminence of attack means that the state cannot protect the at-
tacked individual.
A temporal proximity requirement is one of the biggest
stumbling blocks for women who assert self-defense to a charge of
killing their batterers. Without a showing of temporal prox-
imity-whether imminent or immediate"-the defendant may not
be able to introduce a history of domestic violence, expert testi-
mony about the context of her actions, or obtain any jury instruc-
tion on self-defense." First, there is the question of alternative
conduct: calling for help, or just walking away." More fundamen-
tally, each of these cases presents the issue of why the accused did
not just leave the relationship, rather than staying in a "kill or be
killed" situation." Necessity as well as the credibility of a
woman's self-defense claim is implicated in the question of why
she did not leave the relationship." Judges (and probably juries
too), consistently demand an answer to the question.8 Second, the
80. George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 553, 570 (1996) (arguing that a history of domestic violence is irrelevant to self-
defense).
81. Most jurisdictions prefer an "imminent" requirement to an "immediate" one. Magui-
gan, Battered Women and Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 449.
82. See id. at 439 (emphasizing the importance of meeting the threshold requirements in
terms of the defendant's ability to introduce evidence and obtain jury instructions). See also
Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding no issue of self-
defense despite long history of abuse in sleeping man case).
83. See State v. Harris, 711 So. 2d 266 (La. 1998) (affirming conviction on finding that
testimony from victim's family members that accused had provoked the decedent's violence
was harmless error because the accused "offered no explanation as to why she did not simply
depart as she had in the past, especially considering that she had to pass within feet of an
exterior door on her way to the closet where she retrieved the gun" after having been thrown
to the floor and assaulted).
84. See SCHNEIDER, BATrERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 65, at 77
("the lurking question behind any public or private discussion of battered women is "Why
didn't she leave?") This question unfairly focuses responsibility on the woman, rather than
on the batterer.
85. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 121-22. Six states, however, have found that expert
testimony is not admissible if it is proffered to bolster a witness's credibility. See id. at 124-
25
86. See Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313-14 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The mystery in this
case, as in all battered woman cases, is why Petitioner remained with [her batterer] despite
repeated abuse."). For example, the phenomenon of separation assault has been explained by
evolutionary biologists as "adaptive problems of male reproductive competition and potential
misdirection of paternal investments in species." Margo Wilson et al, Familicide: The Kill-
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response of the accused may have appeared disproportionately
violent (if, for example, the accused shoots her batterer in re-
sponse to his attacking her with only his fists).87 Third, the killing
may have occurred during a lull in the fighting (the sleeping man
paradigm).88 If the judge does not perceive the danger as immi-
nent, no expert testimony about domestic violence will be admit-
ted into evidence, and no self-defense instruction given.89
But-from a relational perspective-time is not the only ba-
sis for imminence." There are situations other than temporal ne-
cessity where the state may be similarly powerless-or disin-
clined-to intervene. Limiting necessity to the temporal element
ignores the problem of absent alternatives.9 If there really is no
escape, or if the accused reasonably perceives that there is none,
and it is only a matter of time until the abuser will kill, then in-
ing of Spouse and Children, 21 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 275 (1995). Although most states
admit expert testimony on this question, some do not. See Wilson, supra (thirty-six states
find battered woman syndrome testimony relevant to the question of why the defendant failed
to leave the relationship; six do not).
87. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88, 91 (S.C. 1992) (recognizing that "it may
be possible to characterize a battered woman as the victim of a continuing assault at the hands
of her batterer ... [so that] self-defense may be satisfied even though the battered woman
acts at a time when the batterer is not physically abusing her" but nonetheless finding that
there was no ineffective assistance for failing to present battered woman syndrome testimony
where such testimony was not at the time recognized as relevant to self-defense).
88. This paradigm, contrary to popular misconceptions, appears to be the minority of
actual cases. See Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 379 (ob-
serving that "the appellate decisions do not support the commonly encountered assertion that
most battered women kill in nonconfrontational situations).
89. For example, in Brown v. State, 512 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. 1999), in a case involving de-
fense of a child, the court declined to admit evidence of prior abuse because the child was not
threatened on the day of the killing. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 864 P.2d 709 (Kan. 1993) (de-
spite a long history of abuse, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of self-defense in-
struction because the deceased had not made threats on the evening of the incident).
90. See Ripstein, supra note 39, at 690 (explaining that "an attack is imminent if it is
sufficiently likely to happen").
91. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 579, 584 (1996) (noting "that if, in fact, the defendant needed to kill in order to
avert death or grievous bodily harm inflicted by the assailant, then she had a right to kill,
regardless of whether a 'short time frame' or some other limitation was the reason for her
need."). Courts do not often see it this way. See, e.g., Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 192 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1995) ("inevitable harm is not the same as imminent harm").
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sisting on a temporal necessity seems rather beside the point of
survival.92
A way to describe this idea of necessity is that the right to
self-defense is triggered by an assailant's conduct that "would
lead a reasonable person to believe that, because of the absence of
genuine alternatives, and because of the impending violence of the
assailant, if she does not resort to defensive aggression, she will
inevitably suffer death or grievous bodily harm by the assailant."93
Notably, it is permissible to kill a putative kidnapper or rapist
without any need to show necessity, presumably because the law
assumes that one faces a 'kill or be killed" choice in those circum-
stances.9 ' The real issue from a relational perspective is that the
imminence requirement in battered women's cases should simi-
larly focus on the question of whether the defense response was
necessary under the circumstances, that is, whether the intru-
sions on the accused's freedom of person were so extreme as to be
tantamount to kidnapping, terrorism, torture and rape.99
Most states incorporate a reasonableness requirement into
imminence in two respects: a requirement that the accused's per-
ception of danger be reasonable, and a requirement that her per-
92. In most jurisdictions, the concept of reasonableness means a reasonable person in the
actor's circumstances. The expert will explain the circumstances. For example, although
domestic disturbance calls are the largest category of calls received by police, and calls now
are likely to end in arrest, that is usually the end of it. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of
Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505,
1519 (1998) (observing that "the reasons for lack of prosecution are many: victim reluctance
or refusal to cooperate; lack of proper police investigation; prosecutors untrained in how to
proceed without the victim's testimony; and the belief that these cases are a private family
matter [, and] [o]f those cases that are prosecuted, many are charged or pled down to misde-
meanors despite facts that suggest the conduct constituted a felony").
93. Zipursky, supra note 91, at 609.
94. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scor, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 456 n.15 (2d ed.
1986) (explaining that deadly force is permitted against "extreme intrusions on freedom of
the person (e.g., kidnapping and rape)" even without a threat of death or severe bodily harm).
95. See id. (noting that "the proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat, but the
immediacy of the response necessary in defense"); Jeffrey B. Murdoch, Comment, Is Immi-
nence Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-Defense Doctrine with the Battered
Woman Syndrome, 20 N. ILL. L. REV. 191, 195 (2000) ("an action is necessary in the self-
defense context to the extent that the harm sought to be avoided would occur absent the de-
fensive act").
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ception of imminence be reasonable." There is some argument
about whether the standard is or ought to be subjective or objec-
tive reasonableness or an amalgam of both,97 but under either of
these standards, what is reasonable depends on the circumstances
at the time of the event.98 Past violence on the part of the de-
ceased is part of the circumstances, and is traditionally admissi-
ble." When two men are engaged in a fight, evidence about the
deceased's past threats of violence against the defendant are ad-
missible under ordinary rules of evidence to explain the circum-
stances.1" The deceased's conduct before the killing is normally
considered relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant's ac-
96. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(a) (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-
902(a) (Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2(a) (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14.20(1) (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.050(1) (West 2000).
97. See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 7, at 216 (arguing that this stan-
dard is neither subjective nor objective but an amalgam of both).
98. See State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 559 (Wash. 1977) (reversing a conviction for
failure to instruct the jury that the circumstances must be judged from the perspective of the
defendant).
99. In a self-defense case, the evidence of the character of the deceased is relevant to
showing the likelihood that the deceased was the primary aggressor, as well as to show that
the accused had a reasonable belief in the necessity of a forceful response. Rule 404 requires
the exclusion of character evidence if its only relevance is to show circumstantially that
particular conduct occurred on the occasion in question. FED. R. EviD. 404. The rule,
however, does not apply to character evidence of the victim. Some states, such as Louisiana,
for example, limit this exception (permitting evidence of the victim's character) to instances
where there has been an overt act by the victim or where there is evidence of domestic
violence. See LA. CODE EviD. ANN. art. 404A(2) (West 1998).
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except: ...
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same....
FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2). Although character evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), it
may be proffered only through opinion or reputation testimony rather than through testimony
about specific instances, unless character of the deceased is an essential element of the de-
fense. See FED. R. EvID. 405(a), (b); State v. Rodrigue, 734 So. 2d 608, 610 (La. 1999) (re-
manding for new trial where court refused to admit character evidence in self-defense). In
battered women's cases, the deceased's character is an essential element of the defense, so
character evidence may come in both through lay and expert testimony. Thus, character
evidence about the deceased ought to be freely .admissible both as testimony about specific
instances of his behavior and as general testimony about the behavior he exhibited.
100. See, e.g., People v. Bush, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (finding
admissible prior threats by the victim against the defendant); State v. Brooks, 734 So. 2d
1232, 1244 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999) (finding previous threats by the deceased admissible);
State v. Clark, 570 N.W.2d 195, 202-03 (N.D. 1997) (holding that prior threats are relevant
to show the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in imminent danger). "
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tions. °1 The decedent's reputation for violence is routinely admis-
sible in self-defense cases, as are the deceased's specific acts of
past violence.0 2 Curiously, these details have a way of being left
out of women's cases.
10 3
Moreover, even if the history of domestic violence is admit-
ted, and a self-defense instruction given, the jury may be con-
strained by an imminence instruction based on temporal immedi-
acy."" An instruction limiting self-defense to temporal proximity
rather than necessity, and failing to explain that the evidence of
past violence must be considered in making a reasonableness de-
termination, may skew the doctrine of self-defense.0 5 Imminence
101. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 739 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that
character evidence is admissible to show who was the aggressor); Brooks, 734 So. 2d at 1239
(holding that evidence of the victim's reputation for violence is admissible to show the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's belief in imminent danger); Petty v. State, 997 P.2d 800, 802(Nev. 2000) (holding that evidence of the victim's character is admissible to show the victim
was the likely aggressor); State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45, 56 (N.J. 1963) (taking the entire
course of the decedent's conduct into consideration for the reasonableness inquiry).
102. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 570 N.W.2d 195, 202 (N.D. 1997) (finding that specific acts
of violence on the part of the victim are admissible to show the defendant's state of mind);
State v. Barnes, No. 98-P-0052, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3294, at *30 (Ohio Ct. App. July
21, 2000) (holding that specific acts by the victim are admissible to show the likelihood that
the victim was the aggressor, whether or not the acts were directed at the defendant); State v.
Day, 535 S.E.2d 431, 436 (S.C. 2000) (holding that a prior act of violence by the victim was
admissible to show reasonable apprehension of violence even though it was not directed at
the defendant).
103. See, e.g., State v. Vigil, 794 P.2d 728, 733 (N.M. 1990) (upholding trial court's denial
of requested instruction and finding no ineffective assistance for failure to call expert despite
testimony that deceased had a history of battering the accused, had beaten her the morning of
his death after she confronted him with evidence that he had been sexually abusing her minor
daughter from a prior marriage); State v. Manning, 598 N.E.2d 25, 30 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)(excluding evidence of decedent's prior conviction for domestic violence, arrest warrant
because such evidence "would only distract the jury from the critical question of [defen-
dant's] guilt or innocence"); Lane v. State, 957 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)(upholding failure to charge jury on self-defense although there was a history of abuse, and
estranged husband threatened on the night of the incident that he would kill the accused, slit
her open and pull her guts out, track her down and kill their daughter, and that she would be
better off to kill herself first, because accused returned home from her daughter's house eight
miles away where she had fled and thus the court found that the imminence requirement had
not been met). See also Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered
Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973, 981 (1995) (contrasting "the
scope of battering with its limited recognition in the courts").
104. See Rosen, supra note 79, at 405.
105. Murdoch,-supra note 95, at 206-07.
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is a proxy for necessity: they are linked ideas." e Because of this
linkage, an instruction on necessity should supplement--or re-
place-the current imminence requirements. 7 The point of self-
defense is that the accused reasonably believed it necessary to
respond to her batterer with force."8 The jury instructions should
specifically direct the jury to consider the history of domestic vio-
lence in this relationship, the decedent's past history of other vio-
lence, and expert testimony on the effects of a history of abuse.' 9
B. Proportionality of Force Used to Threatened Harm
Another facet of necessity is the requirement of proportional-
ity. The traditional rule is that only equal force may be used in
response to a threat."0 Where excessive force is used, the accused
is not entitled to self-defense."' The requirement of proportional-
ity is often assessed with reference to the relative sizes of the ac-
cused and deceased, and the type of weapon used in response to
the assault, because the reasonableness of the threat is measured
from the victim's perspective. A person who is quite small with
106. See Rosen, supra note 79, at 380 ("imminence has no significance independent of the
notion of necessity").
107. Id. at 405. Further, at least one scholar has suggested that this question unfairly
stigmatizes the victim of domestic abuse, and that the entire notion of "battered woman"
should be re-characterized as a power struggle, and termed "separation assault." See Ma-
honey, supra note 12, at 6-7. Expert testimony that-according to the 1993 Violence
Against Women Survey-nineteen percent of separated wives were physically abused by
their former spouse while separated and that the abuse increased after separation in thirty-
five percent of these cases certainly bears on the question of "why didn't she leave?" See H.
JOHNSON, RISK FACTORS ASSOCIATED wrrH NON-LETHAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN BY
MARITAL PARTNERS (C.R. Block & R. Block eds., 1995) (discussing studies).
108. See Smith v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 823 (Ga. 1997) (requiring modification of self-
defense jury instructions in battered woman self-defense case and proposing that the instruc-
tions explain that expert testimony "relates to the issue of the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's belief that the use of force was immediately necessary, even though no use of force
against the defendant may have been, in fact, imminent.").
109. Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 449.
110. See State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570 (N.J. 1997) (acknowledging the male proto-
type behind "the common law regime, [where] even if faced with immediate danger of death
or great bodily harm, an individual could use only equal force to repel the danger").
111. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 200 (1999) ("The proportionality
rule provides that a person is not justified in using force that is excessive in relation to the
harm threatened."). See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 502 S.E.2d 853, 870-71 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding the defendant was not entitled to self-defense instruction where evidence showed
that he had wrested away the baseball bat his wife had used to attempt an attack on him and
that it was in his sole possession before he used it to bludgeon her to death).
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respect to an attacker may be justified, for example, in shooting
the deceased even though the initial attack was a punch or kick."2
In male-on-male violence cases, differences in size routinely are
taken into account in assessing the proportion of force used
against the decedent."' This does not, however, always appear to
be the case in battered women cases, where size differential is
often ignored (at least in many of the reported cases)."'
The requirement of proportionality is malleable, however,
and in some typically male violence cases, it is dispensed with en-
tirely. For example, under the castle doctrine,"" the force used to
defend oneself at home need not be proportionate to the threat of
112. See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 559 (Wash. 1977) (self-defense must reflect
the relative position of the accused-a weaker woman-with respect to her assailant-a
stronger man).
113. See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 760 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2000) (affirming convic-
tion based on part on considerations of defendant's superior physical shape relative to de-
ceased); State v. Barnes, 2000 Ohio Ct. App. Lexis 3294, *17-*18 (finding size differential
between defendant and deceased relevant to reasonableness of belief in imminent danger).
114. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding ac-
cused to a standard of proportionality because the deceased was unarmed, although the de-
ceased had been carrying the murder knife in his pocket, immediately before the knife fell out
of his pocket he threatened to kill the accused and they both grappled for it before she
stabbed him). Although the accused in Miller claimed self-defense, and her lawyer failed to
present any evidence-including expert testimony-on battering, the appellate court declined
to find ineffective assistance based on its validation of the trial court's interpretation that the
accused had stabbed an unarmed man. See id. at 616-17. For a discussion of this case and
the "complex impact gendered assumptions about reasonableness continue to have on the
cases of battered women who kill," see Schneider, Resistance to Equality, supra note 33, at
524 n. 106. See also State v. Gibson, 761 So. 2d 670, 677 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
a claim of self-defense where accused stabbed her boyfriend while he was choking her, be-
cause it was not clear that he was still choking her when she reached for the knife); Reynolds
v. State, 776 So. 2d 698, 700 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (finding, without any question of the
relative sizes of accused and deceased, that whether "a steak knife was disproportionate to
assault by telephone" was a jury question). But see Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 559 (assessing the
reasonableness of the accused's response in light of her diminutive size and physical handi-
caps as compared to the deceased who was a large, visibly intoxicated man).
115. The Model Penal Code provides that deadly force is justifiable if the actor reasonably
believes "that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious-bodily harm,
kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat .. " MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.04(b) (1985). However, deadly force is not permitted if "the actor knows that he can avoid
the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating ... except that (1) the
actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling ..... Id. § 3.04 (b)(ii). The use of deadly
force is justifiable if "the use of force other than deadly force to prevent the commission or
the consummation of the crime would expose the actor or another in his presence to substan-
tial danger of serious bodily harm." Id. § 34.06(30(d)(ii)(2). This is known as the defense of
premises or "castle doctrine."
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harm."6 Deadly force may be used against an intruder to counter
any level of unlawful force.117 Although abused women are pre-
dominantly attacked in their home-which is therefore the locus
of most battered women's self-defense cases-this factor consis-
tently is ignored by the courts."8 The primary reason for this is
that the castle doctrine does not apply to cohabitants."9 This ex-
ception means a woman who is attacked by an intimate in her
home must retreat, while she would not if a stranger had at-
tacked, even if the threats to her were just as real."0
"Nor does the amount of force need to be proportionate in de-
fending oneself against a sexual assault, which is another fre-
quent precipitating factor in the cases of battered women who
kill. 2 ' A sexual assault is deemed the equivalent of a threat of
deadly harm and so can be responded to in kind. In domestic vio-
lence situations, however, where the parties are intimates, this
factor appears to be ignored, even where a sexual assault was the
precipitating event in the chain leading to the decedent's demise.
116. See Green, supra note 61, at 28-29 & n.129 (arguing that the "terrifying experience"
of having one's home invaded is not a good justification for the premises doctrine, because
the death rate from burglary is less than one in 30,000) (citing 1997 FBI Report).
117. See generally State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564 (N.J. 1997).
118. Maryanne E. Kampmann, The Legal Victimization of Battered Women, 15 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 101, 112-13 (1993) ("In case after case, in which the obligation to retreat was
an issue at the trial or on appeal, women have been convicted for killing men who were hold-
ing them with one hand and beating them with the other or who had them pinned down on the
floor or trapped in a comer or were menacing them with a knife or loaded gun.").
119. Cf. Gartland, 694 A.2d at 572 (reversing conviction for failure to instruct the jury that
they needed to consider whether the accused could safely escape under the circumstances, but
nonetheless finding trial court correctly instructed the jury that the accused had a duty to
retreat from her home if she could do so safely, even from her own separate bedroom which
she did not share with her husband).
120. See Kampmann, supra note 118, at 112-13 (observing that because the threat of death
is statistically more significant to a woman who is attacked by an intimate in her home than if
attacked by a stranger, requiring her to retreat from an intimate's attack is inherently unfair).
121. See People v. Garcia, 1 P.3d 214, 221 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing and remanding
conviction of battered wife for second degree murder where court failed to give proper in-
structions, including an instruction that "one may justifiably use deadly force to prevent a
sexual assault").
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C. Absence of Aggression on the Part of the Defendant
The element of absence of aggression is routinely considered
to be a requirement that the defendant did not start the conflict. 122
This may be problematic in light of a common misperception that
battered women provoke the violence.' Some jurisdictions re-
quire an overt act by the decedent on the particular occasion,
some merely require evidence that the decedent was the aggres-
sor.'2 This reflects a preference for the innocent party when two
individuals seek to fulfill their self-preservation imperatives.2 5
Many courts interpret this requirement quite broadly in male con-
flicts, permitting a time line that encompasses the past acts and
reputation of the victim in determining who was the likely aggres-
sor on this occasion.126 In domestic violence situations, however,
courts are more likely to narrow their focus to the question of who
instigated the immediate quarrel in which the deceased was
killed.2 7  Domestic violence situations are not one-time encoun-
ters, but ongoing relationships. Courts need to broaden the time-
frame of their focus to encompass the ongoing nature of domestic
violence.
Moreover, women who defy the passive victim stereotype by
actively defending themselves in the course of a battering rela-
tionship are often seen as undeserving of a self-defense instruc-
122. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 739 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (holding self-
defense testimony about the victim's character was admissible to show who was really the
aggressor in a parking lot confrontation in which the defendant left the parking lot, returned
with a gun, and shot the victim); State v. Brooks, 734 So. 2d 1232, 1235, 1241 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1999) (finding, in a case involving a parking lot shooting, that testimony relevant to self-
defense was admissible although the victim was unarmed and the defendant was armed and
fired first shots, but the victim lunged at the defendant after the warning shots were fired);
Petty v. State, 997 P.2d 800, 803 (Nev. 2000) (involving a case in which the defendant shot
an unarmed victim in a fight over a pair of pants, but testimony concerning the victim's repu-
tation for violence was nonetheless admissible to show the defendant's reasonable belief in
the necessity of using deadly force).
123. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 711 So. 2d 266 (La. 1998) (affirming conviction despite
"harmless error" of admitting decedent's family's testimony that the accused had provoked
her husband's violence).
124. Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense, supra note 5, at 423.
125. David McCord & Sandra K. Lyons, Moral Reasoning and the Criminal Law: The
Example of Self-Defense, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 97, 131 (1992).
126. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 107, 109.
127. See sources cited supra note 111.
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tion.' 2 They are perceived to be engaging in mutual combat or
provocation (and therefore are not "innocent").129  Rather, they
may be attempting to survive in the face of a society that offers
little help or protection.'"
Like proportionality, the duty to retreat is based on the ne-
cessity requirement. 3 ' Under the common law doctrine of justi-
fied homicide, a defender must retreat or lack an opportunity to
retreat.3 2  Although most jurisdictions do not impose a duty to
retreat, even without a duty to retreat, the possibility of escape is
relevant to the necessity of the accused's action.'33 Like the immi-
nence requirement, the retreat requirement addresses the rea-
128. The prosecutor's closing argument in Day provides a good example of this misconcep-
tion that true victims are passive: "Valoree's in mutual combat here. It's Valoree and Steve
in the ring again, just like happened so many other times. She's in it and this other is a lie."
People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing trial court's exclusion
of battered woman syndrome testimony, finding it admissible to dispel misconceptions that
"a woman in a bettering relationship is free to leave at any time ... that women are masochis-
tic... and that they intentionally provoke their husbands"). Defense counsel also character-
ized the defendant's experience as "mutual combat." Id. at 923. The appellate court recog-
nized that expert testimony "would have disabused the jury of the notion that because a
woman strikes back at her batterer, she is engaging in 'mutual combat."' Id.
129. See Schneider, Resistance to Equality, supra note 33, at 499 (citing cases where bat-
tered women who seek to protect themselves are not recognized as battered women by the
courts, and observing that "women who are battered, and particularly, women who are bat-
tered and kill, are simultaneously both victims and agents").
130. See Schneider, Resistance to Equality, supra note 33, at 497-98 (arguing that women
cannot be categorized simplistically as victims or agents because they are often both simulta-
neously, and observing that "women who are battered are also survivors, active help-seekers
who find little help and protection from the state, with extraordinary abilities to strategize in
order to keep themselves and their families safe under terrible circumstances").
131. The Model Penal Code prohibits the use of deadly force against an aggressor if an
actor "knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by
retreating." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1985). This is a version of the minority
rule; most jurisdictions do not require retreat from an aggressor. DRESSLER, supra note 111,
at 227. But in the majority of jurisdictions, "a nonaggressor is permitted to use deadly force
to repel an unlawful deadly attack, even if he is aware of a place to which he can retreat in
complete safety." Id. at 204.
132. See Green, supra note 61, at 9 (noting that "[u]nder the traditional English common
law doctrine of justified homicide, one of the elements of necessity is that ... a defender
must 'retreat to the wall' (or lack an opportunity to retreat)").
133. See State v. Gibson, 761 So. 2d 670, 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000) ("Although there is
no unqualified duty to retreat, the possibility of escape is a factor in determining whether or
not the defendant had a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to avoid the dan-
ger."); Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 93 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1994) (acknowledging that
while "a party has no obligation to retreat from a confrontation ... the possibility of escape
should be a recognized factor in determining whether deadly force was necessary to avoid
death or great bodily harm").
110 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 47
sonableness of the accused's belief in the necessity of using force
against an attacker."
Despite the absence of a duty to retreat in most jurisdic-
tions,' many courts and juries nonetheless impose a type of duty
to retreat by requiring a duty to escape an abusive relationship.'36
The duty to escape an abusive relationship is the root of the often
unspoken question "why didn't she just leave?"'37 The idea is ei-
ther that the accused is lying about the reality of the abuse (be-
cause why would any sane person stay in a dangerous situation?),
or that she provoked the abuse (implying that she is masochistic
and enjoyed the abuse).' Although most states permit expert
testimony on battering and its effects as relevant to the question
of why the defendant did not leave the relationship, six states re-
134. See, e.g., State v. Ordway, 619 A.2d 819, 828 (R.I. 1992) (imposing a duty to retreat
from her own home on accused who had been abused for years and was refused self-defense
in stabbing of her husband although at the time of the incident, the deceased had beaten her,
put her in front of the T.V. set and told her not to move) (reversing and remanding based on
prosecutor's asking her if she remembered stabbing her first husband).
135. DRESSLER, supra note 111, at 203-04.
136. See Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence, supra note 27, at 82 n.171 (ob-
serving that "[m]any people, including judges, tend to confuse the question of leaving the
abusive relationship with the question of the defendant's duty to retreat on the occasion of
homicide" and proposing that expert testimony be admissible to help the jury to understand
why the two should not be conflated). See also State v. Harris, 711 So. 2d 266, 270 (La.
1998) (noting that the accused "offered no explanation as to why she did not simply depart as
she had in the past, especially considering that she had to pass within feet of an exterior door
on her way to the closet where she retrieved the gun"). The court also upheld the trial court's
upward deviation from state sentencing guidelines because "the defendant could have easily
escaped as she had in the past, if she were truly concerned about her safety." Id.
137. This question surfaces also in the imminence/necessity requirement, demonstrating the
linkage of the issues, particularly in battered women self-defense cases. Notably, the immi-
nence/necessity/duty to leave issue is one that even counsel for the defense often fail to rec-
ognize. See, e.g., People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 916, 924-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (acknowledg-
ing admissibility of testimony about battering relationships to dispel myths and preconcep-
tions of jury in case where both prosecution and defense played upon such myths); Com-
monwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 784-85 (Pa. 1989) (finding reversible error in de-
fense counsel's failure to request jury instruction and present expert testimony to rebut myths
about the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, including her choice to stay in an abu-
sive relationship).
138. See, e.g., State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 576 (N.J. 1997) (observing that "jurors may
confuse the question of leaving the abusive partner with the duty to retreat on the occasion");
Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 619 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (reversing for ineffective
assistance where counsel failed to proffer expert testimony to explain-inter-alia-why
accused battered woman did not leave the relationship).
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ject such evidence. 39 Notably, in bar-room brawls, no one asks
why the accused put himself in danger in the first place, by going
into a situation where such occurrences are common, or why he
didn't just leave a situation that was becoming dangerous before
he had to respond to an attack.
Even in the minority of jurisdictions that have a retreat re-
quirement, no retreat duty is imposed when the defender is at
home when attacked. 4" This is the castle doctrine exception to the
retreat requirement. The castle doctrine, however, does not often
apply to women, because in many states, the "castle doctrine" ex-
ception is limited to noncohabitants."' Thus, in a duty-to-retreat
jurisdiction, battered wom'en are not permitted to claim that they
killed their batterer in self-defense if they could have escaped on
that occasion." Because judges and juries often are not aware of
139. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 122 (noting that 34 states consider expert testimony to be
relevant to the question of why the accused did not leave the relationship and that six states,
including Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, Ohio and Washington, do not).
140. See Green, supra note 61, at 9. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, under the defense of
premises doctrine, even without any perceived threat of death or bodily harm, a defender in
his own home "may use deadly force against an aggressor who is making ... an unlawful,
felonious, or violent entry into such premises." Id. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the defense
of premises doctrine has been extended to defense of vehicles. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:20(3) (West Supp. 2001) (homicide is justifiable if "committed against a person
whom one reasonably believes to be likely to use any unlawful force against a person present
[in a motor vehicle] ... while committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery" of
the vehicle). In short, in many jurisdictions, and in some circumstances, the intruder need not
pose any reasonable threat to bodily integrity. George Fletcher explains this rule as based on
a principle of personal autonomy. See George P. Fletcher, The Right to Life, 13 GA. L. REV.
1371, 1378 (1979). As Fletcher explains his notion:
Killing an aggressor is permissible if it is the only means available to prevent the
invasion of even a minor interest. Shooting an apple thief is right and proper if
there is no other way to stop her. The rationale of this theory is that those in the
right should never yield to wrongdoers. The only question is: who is in the Right
and who is in the Wrong. The competing interests are irrelevant.
Id. at 1378.
141. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1006 (D.C. 1986) (castle doctrine
does not apply where both parties have right to occupy home); State v. Carothers, 594
N.W.2d 897, 903 (Minn. 1999) (finding no duty to retreat from intruder in home-even when
invited-and distinguishing from cases involving cohabitants, where it did impose a duty to
retreat); Commonwealth v. Walker, 288 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. 1972) (castle doctrine does not
apply to cohabitants).
142. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 711 So. 2d 266, 269 (La. 1998) (affirming manslaughter
conviction on finding that admitting testimony of deceased's relatives that accused had pro-
voked battering incidents was harmless error because "the undisputed facts of the homicide,
and not the complained of evidence ... kept the jury from acquitting"). There was testimony
of a history of abuse in the case, but curiously, self-defense was apparently not raised. The
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the limited escape opportunities feasible, they may assume she
could have just walked out the door, called the police, or sought
refuge in a battered woman's shelter.14 An expert may be needed
to testify about the paucity of such options.
IV. CONCEPTS OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY: BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME EVIDENCE
In order to counteract the perceived unfairness of formal
rules in the cases of battered women who kill, courts and legisla-
tures have mandated admissibility about domestic violence in the
guise of battered woman syndrome testimony.'" Courts increas-
ingly view the situation of battered women who kill as involving
two victims." At least twelve states have statutes mandating
admissibility of expert testimony on battering in self-defense
cases.'" Thirty-nine states permit expert testimony on battering
to "prove the defendant is a battered woman or suffers from bat-
tered woman syndrome., 47  The reason for such widespread ad-
missibility may stem "from a belated effort to make amends for
prior societal and legal insensitivity."48  Generally, battered
deceased had been battering the accused on the night of the incident, he left the room, and
while he was gone, the accused went into a different room and armed herself with a gun. See
Harris, 711 So. 2d at 268. When the deceased re-entered the room, the accused shot him.
But see Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1058 (Fla. 1999) (overruling prior case law regard-
ing duty to retreat and holding that there is no duty to retreat from the residence even for
cohabitants).
143. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 1 P.3d 214, 220 (Col. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing conviction
of battered woman for failure to instruct jury that defendant had no duty to retreat, in light of
the prosecutor's comments the accused could have "gone to another safe house or woman's
center.., gone to a hotel ... or to friends ... or for a long run").
144. See Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 476 (Nev. 2000) (observing that sixty-nine per-
cent of states find expert testimony admissible "to explain battering and its effects generally")
(citing Parrish, supra note 4).
145. People v. Evans, 631 N.E.2d 281, 288 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that "the law can no
longer ignore the fact that in reality what occurred involved two victims").
146. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 99.
147. See Boykins, 995 P.2d at 476.
148. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence
Law, 46 DuKE L.. 461, 466 (1996) (noting the impact of political concerns on evidence law).
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woman syndrome testimony is admissible without any examina-
tion of its scientific validity.'49
Once courts are convinced that there is evidence of a batter-
ing relationship and self-defense is at issue, most courts, state
and federal, admit expert testimony about battering as relevant to
the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that force
was necessary and to her perception of imminent danger."' A
large majority of the states also find battered woman syndrome
testimony relevant to the question of why the defendant failed to
leave the relationship.'
A. What Is Battered Woman Syndrome?
Lenore Walker, a clinical psychologist, developed a theory
that typified women's reactions to domestic violence as a psycho-
logical condition termed "battered woman syndrome."'52 According
to this theory, domestic violence occurs in cycles, typified by three
phases.' The first is a tension-building phase, followed by a vio-
lent incident where the batterer expresses uncontrollable rage,
and a third phase where the batterer expresses profound regret
and intentions to reform." During the first two phases of the cy-
cle, the victim experiences a state of fear and anxiety which
Walker calls "cumulative terror."'55 The third stage, or "honey-
moon phase," is typified by "extremely loving behavior" and lulls
women into believing that the abuser has reformed.5 6 Learned
149. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 113 (noting that only fourteen states require some evi-
dence that battered woman syndrome is generally accepted in the scientific community, and
nine states have explicitly rejected the need for such a showing).
150. See id. at 84, 121 (noting that only Georgia and Wyoming have found battered woman
syndrome testimony not to be relevant to reasonableness; nineteen states find expert testi-
mony relevant to the defendant's perception of temporal proximity to danger; six find it rele-
vant to the defendant's credibility, and two find it relevant in assessing proportionality of
force used). Most states, however, do not permit experts to testify to "ultimate issue" of
reasonableness or self-defense. See id. (fourteen states permit such testimony; nineteen do
not).
151. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 85.
152. See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979). Walker later ex-
panded her theory. See LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
153. See WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at 95-96.
154. Id. at96.
155. See id.
156. Id.
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helplessness, or a false perception that there is no escape, is char-
acteristic of Walker's syndrome theory and typifies the first two
stages. 
157
B. Feminist Critique
Battered woman syndrome testimony has been attacked on
several fronts. First, feminists argue that it creates an image of
flawed, deranged women overreacting to their distorted percep-
tions of reality. "8 This image perpetuates negative stereotypes of
women as less than rational, and undermines the goals of sub-
stantive equality this testimony was designed to achieve.159 Thus,
the syndrome testimony perpetuates patriarchal stereotypes."
Further, using battered woman syndrome as an explanation shifts
the focus of domestic violence to the woman, suggesting that she
is the partner who is impaired.
16 1
Second, the perpetuated stereotype of helpless irrational
women reacting pathologically, but self-interestedly, ignores the
complexities of women's roles.'62 Rather than deranged, helpless
victims, feminists argue, battered women may be reacting sanely
and rationally to a heinous situation that has consequences not
only for themselves as individuals, but for family integrity and
their children." Thus, interests other than the immediate self-
157. WALKER, THEBATERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at 86.
158. See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Founda-
tions, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 77-82 (1998) (summarizing the feminist critique of battered
woman syndrome).
159. Cf. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 7, at 216 (explaining that the
"goal of women's self-defense work (including the use of battered woman syndrome testi-
mony) has been to overcome sex-bias in the law of self-defense and to equalize treatment of
women in the courts" but suggesting that "the expert testimony cases pose troubling ques-
tions about the degree to which these goals have been realized").
160. See Rebecca D. Comia, Current Use of Battered Woman Syndrome: Institutionaliza-
tion of Negative Stereotypes About Women, 8 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 99, 114-22 (1997) (argu-
ing that battered woman syndrome testimony stereotypes women as irrational and leads to
reinforcing negative images which disadvantages women in child custody battles, child abuse
cases, and bar disciplinary proceedings).
161. See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 65, at 24.
162. See, e.g., MURRAY STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY (1980) (examining the social structures leading to domestic violence).
163. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 19-24.
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interest of the battered woman may inform her decision to con-
tinue trying to salvage a battering relationship."'
Third, battered women's syndrome testimony perpetuates
stereotypes that are contrafactual. 6  The battered woman syn-
drome's learned helplessness. theory assumes that women are free
to choose to leave (but fail to leave because of their distorted per-
ceptions). The underlying assumption is that women enjoy the
same social autonomy as men and are therefore free to leave.
This assumption is fundamentally contrary to women's experi-
ence. 166
C. Scientific Validity?
Whatever the negative consequences of using battered
woman's syndrome, however, there is an even more fundamental
flaw with battered woman's syndrome testimony: it lacks empiri-
cal support and thus fails on validity grounds. Syndromes are not
science. 17 Such testimony cannot be helpful to the jury.68
Following the Supreme Court's Daubert, Joiner and Kumho
Tire trilogy of evidentiary cases, scientific validity is a prerequi-
site for admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts. Al-
though most homicide cases are tried in state courts, where
Daubert may not apply, the validity inquiry is increasingly impor-
tant even in states rejecting the federal standard.169 In Daubert v.
164. See Taslitz, A Feminist Approach, supra note 158, at 183 ("A woman's reluctance to
leave, therefore, may not reflect an animal-like distortion of perception-an inability to
perceive a chance to flee-but rather a sane, balanced commitment to restoring her family
and protecting her children's economic security.").
165. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 18-24 (describing the frequently fatal consequences
for women who choose to leave battering relationships).
166. See id.
167. See infra pp. 116-17.
168. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). Expert testimony
in the federal courts is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides that "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
FED. R. EviD. 702.
169. For example, New York courts, although rejecting Daubert in favor of Frye, are none-
theless finding it necessary to discuss scientific validity. See, e.g., People v. Wernick, 674
N.E.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. 1996) ("No threshold evidentiary foundation whatsoever was offered
that acknowledged the validity or existence of defense counsel's postulate to warrant these
Loyola Law Review
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,'70 the Supreme Court set out
gatekeeping requirements for district court judges to evaluate the
scientific validity and "fit" of expert testimony. In General Elec-
tric Co. v. Joiner,7' the Court reiterated the Daubert standards,
expounded on its notion of "fit," and explained that, while the
standards for admissibility had changed, the traditional abuse of
discretion standard of review had not. Finally, in Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael,'72 the Court extended the validity inquiry to what the
lower courts call the "soft" sciences, such as engineering, social
science, and psychology.'
The Daubert Court set out four "flexible guidelines" to help
judges assess the validity of expert testimony: testability; peer
review and publication; error rate; and general acceptance.'
These "flexible guidelines"'75 as applied to the kind of psychologi-
cal testimony implicated by the battered woman syndrome illumi-
nate a number of difficulties with this evidence.
176
experts using this kind of extrapolated material to bolster their expert opinions."); Clemente
v. Blumenbert, 705 N.Y.S.2d 792, 798-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (noting that although New
York does not follow Daubert, New York law contains many principles inherent in Daubert,
including importance of judge's role as gatekeeper in determining scientific validity of expert
evidence).
170. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
171. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
172. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
173. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 148. For cases drawing this distinction between "hard"
and "soft" sciences, see, e.g., Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1297 (8th Cir.
1997) ("There is some question as to whether the Daubert analysis should be applied at all to
'soft' sciences such as psychology."); United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1171 (2d
Cir. 1993) (finding 'soft' science expertise is less likely to overwhelm the common sense of
the average juror than 'hard science' expertise"); and United States v. Scholl, 959 F. Supp.
1189, 1191 (D. Ariz. 1997) (noting that although Daubert's criteria "are more easily applied
to the rigid sciences ... they have also been applied to the soft sciences such as psychology
and psychiatry").
174. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
175. Id.
176. In an earlier article, I suggested that judges could put flesh on the bare bones of the
Court's Daubert analysis by doing five things: 1) identify and examine the proffered theory
and hypothesis for their power to explain the data; 2) examine the data that support (or un-
dermine) the expert's theory; 3) use supportable assumptions to fill the inevitable gaps be-
tween data and theory; 4) examine the methodology; and 5) engage in probabilistic assess-
ment of the link between the data and the hypothesis. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 9, at
1571. This analysis encompasses the Daubert analysis but attempts to give judges more
guidance for their gatekeeping duties. The above analysis of battered woman syndrome
testimony uses the heuristic to examine this particular type of expert testimony. 116
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Battered woman syndrome testimony fails under all four of
these guidelines. The theory's testability is questionable due to
the researcher's failure to specify the meaning of "battered
woman," its methodology is suspect, and the data do not support
the conclusions.177 Although Dr. Walker has published her find-
ings in peer-reviewed journals, her studies have been widely cas-
tigated as unreliable by social scientists on methodological
grounds. Because her studies lacked controls, error rates are im-
possible to determine. And although her work has been widely
accepted by the legal culture, it is far more controversial in social
science circles.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the four Daubert guidelines
are far too curtailed to provide a sufficient guide to evaluating
scientific evidence, and proposed a heuristic for such evaluation.'78
The five aspects of the heuristic will be discussed to illuminate the
difficulties with this evidence: (1) the explanatory power of the
proffered hypothesis; (2) the data that supports (and undermines)
the expert's theory; (3) the assumptions underlying inevitable
gaps between data and theory; (4) the methodology used in testing
the hypothesis; and (5) a probabilistic assessment of the link be-
tween the data and the hypothesis.
1. The Explanatory Power of the Hypothesis?
In order to assess the scientific validity of battered woman
syndrome, the first prerequisite is to identify the hypothesis and
whether it makes sense in terms of its testability, openness to cri-
tique, and rationality.'79 Dr. Walker's hypothesis is that women in
battering relationships experience a cycle of violence, an experi-
ence which they are bound to repeat because "learned helpless-
ness" makes it impossible for them to escape the relationship.8 °
177. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J., 1005, 1054 (1989) (explaining that
the "[u]se of vague or undefined criteria for classification prevents empirical corroboration
altogether, since the observations which would corroborate or falsify the classification are
never explicitly stated").
178. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 9.
179. See id. at 1591 (building on Popper's contention that falsifiability-consisting of
testability, openness to critique, and rationality-is the cornerstone of science).
180. In explaining the genesis of her battered woman syndrome theory, Dr. Walker wrote:
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Although one might be able, at least in principle, to test such a
theory, one would have to define a number of terms in order for
the tests to have any meaning. 8' To determine whether there are
precise logical consequences to the hypothesis that are incompati-
ble with alternative hypotheses, the terms of the hypothesis must
be precisely defined. 8 2 Descriptive terms, such as "battered" and
"woman," for example, must be given operational definitions for
the purpose of testing in order for the hypothesis to explain any-
thing.83
Dr. Walker's primary study, performed in 1984, consisted of
a structured questionnaire administered to four hundred self-
referred women living in six states.'" For purposes of her hy-
pothesis, Dr. Walker defines a battered woman as a woman A18
years of age or over, who is or has been in an intimate relation-
ship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected her to force-
ful physical/ and or psychological abuse."' The vagueness of this
definition is illustrated by the definitions of "repeatedly" as "more
than once" and "abuse" as "extreme verbal harassment and ex-
pressing comments of a derogatory nature with negative value
judgments" as well as physical assaults.'86 Almost any couple who
had occasional spats could, under this definition, be considered to
Remembering the earlier studies of Martin Seligman and his dogs who developed learned
helplessness from exposure to non-escapable random and variable aversive stimulation, I
hypothesized that battered women may also have lost their ability to predict that what they
did would protect themselves from further harm if they perceived the abuse as non-
escapable, random and variable punishment. I liked this theory because it explained how
women could function so well in one setting and be so ineffective at home in stopping the
violence. It also helped explain why women didn't leave; they developed coping strategies
that helped them minimize the pain and danger from the abuse at the cost of escape skills.
Lenore E. Walker, The Transmogrification of a Feminist Foremother, in WOMEN & THERAPY
517-29 (1995).
181. See Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 177, at 1054 (observing that a "hy-
pothesis can be tested only by making explicit the behaviors and observations upon which it
is based").
182. Beecher-Monas, supra note 9, at 1585 (citing Lakatos, who explained that the articu-
lation of meaning is a fundamental precondition for appraisal).
183. For an explanation of the importance of the clear articulation of terms in hypothesis
testing, see ERNST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 7-8 (1961).
184. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at 202.
185. Id. at 203.
186. Id.
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have a battering relationship."7 The fallacy of using such a broad
definition that nearly any relationship could fall within it to ex-
plore the relationships of battered women is that such a theory
becomes fundamentally untestable.' 88
Moreover, the research identified no control groups with
which to compare the responses."" This made it impossible to de-
termine how the responses of even these broadly defined women
differed from those who were not so defined. Without controls, the
hypothesis cannot be critiqued and loses explanatory power-its
ability to explain anything."9 The absence of controls thus vio-
lates a fundamental principle of hypothesis testing.
Further, the subjects of the study were asked about only four
incidents of domestic violence (the first, second, worst, and latest),
and were asked to characterize the assailants' behavior before and
after each incident. 9' On the basis of the subjects' numerical as-
sessment of these incidents, the interviewer recorded whether
"evidence of tension building or loving contrition" existed.'92 This
violates principles of social science research in that it is the inter-
viewer's expectations that color the responses."'
2. What Data Support or Undermine the Hypothesis?
A good theory or hypothesis must explain the facts that are
known about a particular subject, both those that support and
those that appear to refute it.' The trouble with the data Walker
187. See generally David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986).
188. Karl Popper explained that the rationality of a hypothesis consists of "stating one's
problem clearly . . . and examining its various proposed solutions critically." KARL R.
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 16 (rev. ed. 1992).
189. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at 203.
190. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 9, at 1585 ("The importance of a control group (for
experimental studies) or a null hypothesis (for observational studies) is that by such means a
researcher exposes the chosen hypothesis to the possibility of falsification."). Unless it is
exposed to such rigorous questioning, and has withstood the critique, one cannot have any
confidence in the validity of the hypothesis.
191. WALKER, THEBATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at 96.
192. Id.
193. See Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome, supra note 187, at 638 (citing T. COOK
& D. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSuES FOR FIELD
SETTNGS 66 (1979)).
194. Beecher-Monas, supra note 9, at 1591.
11920011
Loyola Law Review
collected from the 200 page questionnaires do not support the au-
thor's conclusion that a three-part cycle characterizes battering
relationships.' Walker herself has acknowledged that her data
do not show a common cycle in all relationships or even a pattern
of three distinct phases where such a cycle does exist.' Even as-
suming the questions were properly phrased so as not to be lead-
ing-which does not appear to be the case-and the interviewers
did not skew their responses-again, a questionable assumption-
the research does not provide data which support Dr. Walker's
hypothesis of a cycle of violence. Her 1984 research shows that
fewer than thirty-eight percent of the women interviewed had
experienced the alleged cycle of violence. 97 That means that well
over half of her subjects are not "characteristic." Dr. Walker
makes no attempt to account for the data that undermine her hy-
pothesis.
3. What Assumptions Are Being Made?
Not only is Dr. Walker's hypothesis virtually untestable, her
data contradictory to her conclusions, but a fundamental assump-
tion of the study design itself was flawed. The surveys were ad-
ministered to women who were self-referred or patients in Dr.
Walker's clinic.' In order to show what the study purports to
show, the surveys would have to be administered to "typical" bat-
tered women, that is, women who are representative of the popu-
lation being studied. The fallacy of the research design is that
women who describe themselves as "battered" may not be repre-
sentative of battered women generally. 9 Moreover, the re-
searcher's study becomes suspect as biased when the researcher
gives selective attention to expected behavior.2" This affects the
study in two ways: first, the researcher may look for data that
confirm (and ignore data that refute) the hypothesis; second, the
195. See Lenore E. Walker, Psychology and Law, Symposium: Women and the Law, 20
PEPP. L. REV. 1170, 1184 (1993) (arguing that four patterns are common).
196. Id.
197. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at 96-97.
198. Id.
199. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 28-32 (explaining that women who have been bat-
tered often resist labeling themselves as such, and only can be categorized on the basis of the
types of conduct to which they have been subjected).
200. Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 177, at 1055.
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study subjects (who, because they are self-selected, know the
study is about battered women) may report data to the research-
ers that they believe the researcher wishes to hear."0 Thus, both
the study design and execution are based on mistaken assump-
tions of representativeness and freedom from bias.
In addition, the concept of learned helplessness, central to
Walker's theory, hypothesizes that, like dogs exposed to electric
shock every time they attempt to leave their cages so that they
eventually refuse to leave even in the absence of shock, women
learn to become helpless and refuse to leave an abusive relation-
ship.2" This theory of learned helplessness assumes that women
are-at least at some point prior to the time they kill their batter-
ers-free to leave. This assumption is highly questionable in light
of what we know about separation assault. 3 Women who are
killed by their batterers are overwhelmingly attempting to sepa-
rate from the relationship.2 4
4. Is the Methodology Sound?
Walker conducted two separate studies of battered women.205
Each study was based on a survey questionnaire. The first study
interviewed one hundred women who were self-referred volun-
teers or were taken from Walker's practice.2 ' The second study,
consisting of 435 women, was entirely self-referred. 7 One of the
fundamentals of survey design is that the survey population (the
women interviewed) be representative of the target population
(battered women generally). 8 Walker made no claims to repre-
sentativeness of the sample surveyed. 9 In addition, control
201. See Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 177, at 1062-63 (discussing the
problems of bias).
202. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at 96.
203. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 70-79. See generally MARTIN DALY & MARGO
WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988) (postulating a Darwinian view of men who batter).
204. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 70-79.
205. See supra note 152.
206. See WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at xiii.
207. See id. at 95.
208. Shari S. Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 221, 236 (1994).
209. Representativeness is the ability of measurements to fairly describe the target popula-
tion. For a discussion of representativeness and the importance of random sampling methods,
including choice of target population and sampling frame, see David H. Kaye & David A. 121
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groups-one of the hallmarks of science-were absent from the
studies." ° Assessment of social science data involves examining
the statistical choices made by the researcher.21 Without control
groups, and some attempt at unbiased selection, there is no way
to disprove the null hypothesis (that the results were due to mere
chance). Walker explained that her decision to omit controls was
based on considerations of time and expense because the research
was intended to be merely preliminary to more rigorous studies.212
Unfortunately, those more rigorous studies have never been done.
D. Probabilistic Assessment of the Link Between Data and
Hypothesis
Social science evidence presents particular concerns about
scientific validity. Social context evidence is generally gleaned
from surveys, which are conducted for the purpose of collecting
data.21 Courts have rarely questioned the scientific validity of
survey evidence (on other than relevance grounds), generally find-
ing it admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 703.214 Nonethe-
less, as expert testimony in social science evidence, surveys too
must meet the standards of scientific validity to be admissible.215
Accordingly, experts relying on surveys must be prepared to ac-
count for their underlying hypothesis (purpose), their methodol-
ogy (including sampling design, target population, survey instru-
ment, and interviewer training), assumptions, results (including
rates and patterns of missing data) and statistioal analyses re-
flected in the surveys."' In order for social science testimony to
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
331,343-46 (1994).
210. Control or comparison groups and control questions "are the most reliable means for
assessing response levels against the baseline level of error associated with a particular ques-
tion." Diamond, supra note 208, at 252.
211. See Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 177, at 1035 (emphasizing the im-
portance of analyzing statistical assumptions in the social sciences).
212. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 152, at 203.
213. See Diamond, supra note 208, at 225 (although the source of data may be individuals,
a survey applies to any description or enumeration, whether or not an individual is the source
of the information and thus may encompass enumerating inanimate objects such as the num-
ber of trees destroyed in a fire).
214. See id. Facts or data "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field" are recognized under the rule. FED. R. EvD. 703.
215. See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
216. See Diamond, supra note 208, at 231-33.
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meet standards of scientific validity, the research must have at-
tempted to minimize biases in the selection of problems, the focus
of research conclusions, the identification of relevant facts, and
the assessment of data. 17
Dr. Walker's research suffers from problems in each of these
areas. The presence of too many gaps in her analysis makes this
syndrome testimony wholly unreliable. Dr. Walker's broadly
framed hypothesis is virtually untestable. Her data, methodology,
and assumptions all reveal fatal flaws. Although other research-
ers have attempted to remedy these flaws, there remains no em-
pirical support for the proposition that the majority of battered
women suffer from the symptoms Dr. Walker described.
218 Fur-
ther, it is rare that any testimony that the particular accused suf-
fered from these symptoms is adduced.219 Thus, its admissibility
under the Daubert trilogy is highly questionable.
Currently, Dr. Walker argues that battered woman syn-
drome is a sub-species of PTSD.220 This is misconceived, however,
because neither she nor any other researcher has ever remedied
the fundamental problems with her research: the absence of em-
pirical support for the syndrome.22 Notably, Dr. Walker does not
217. See Laura Etlinger, Comment, Social Science Research in Domestic Violence Law: A
Proposal to Focus on Evidentiary Use, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1259, 1276 (1995) (advocating in-
creased use of valid social science evidence).
218. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 8-1.5, at 349 (1997) (discussing the fact that battered
woman syndrome has not been adequately tested).
219. See Mary A. Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1198-99 (1993) (ex-
plaining the conceptual problems of admitting battered woman syndrome as a subspecies of
PTSD).
220. Lenore E. Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321, 327 (1992). A number of courts have followed this lead. See,
e.g., State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. 1997) (expert witness testified regard-
ing battered woman syndrome, which she described as a subset of PTSD); Bechtel v. State,
840 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (acknowledging that battered woman syndrome is
considered a sub-category of PTSD).
221. See Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense, supra note 220, at 330-32.
Battered woman syndrome testimony should not be permitted to sneak in under the guise of a
"sub-category" of PTSD. Although Doctor Walker now contends that "Battered Woman
Syndrome is considered a sub-category of the generic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder" this
claim has not been substantiated. For the reasons discussed above, her theory lacks empirical
basis and cannot meet the requirements for valid science. Nonetheless, many courts appear to
accept this misguided notion. See, e.g., Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d at 193 (expert witness testi-
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proffer any new studies for her assertion that "Battered Woman
Syndrome is considered a sub-category of the generic Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder" but simply reiterates the old theory
under a new guise.222
Post-traumatic stress disorder is well studied, has ample
support, and some battered women may indeed suffer from it.2'
In cases where the accused suffers from the disorder, this testi-
mony regarding her state of mind should be available as excuse
testimony. Slipping battered woman syndrome into self-defense
testimony as a sub-species of PTSD not only is unjustified from
an empirical standpoint, it conflates justification and excuse.
V. TRANSCENDING FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS:
A PLEA FOR INCREASED EMPIRICISM IN THE COURTS
The admissibility of battered woman syndrome testimony
was the widely adopted solution to the insight that goals of formal
equality are not met in battered women's self-defense cases. 224
However, battered women syndrome testimony perpetuates in-
vidious myths of derangement and irrationality and lacks scien-
fled regarding battered woman syndrome, which she described as a subset of post-traumatic
stress disorder); State v. Engel, 684 N.E.2d 1311, 1317 (Ohio 1997) (testimony of clinical
psychologist that defendant "is, indeed, suffering from all the symptoms of battered woman
syndrome, including severe levels of type II PTSD"); Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 7 (acknowledging
that battered woman syndrome is considered a sub-category of Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der); Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 854 & n.28 (R.I. 1997) (noting that "Rhode Island
does not stand alone in its decision to allow social workers... to testify concerning treatment
and diagnosis of emotional-trauma syndromes like PTSD"). But see Marley v. State, 729
N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (admitting testimony about PTSD under Indiana's
battering statute and acknowledging that PTSD, unlike battered woman syndrome, is a rec-
ognized mental disorder).
222. See, e.g., Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 476 (Nev. 2000) (noting that Dr. Walker
testified at trial, and continued to describe the three-phase cycle of violence and a pattern of
learned helplessness as a characteristic of battered women).
223. A clinical diagnosis requires that the patient meet a specific set of criteria in each
symptom area. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV].
224. See Maguigan, Batjered Women and Self Defense, supra note 5, at 379. Professor
Maguigan has argued that battered woman syndrome testimony is neither necessary nor help-
ful, and contends that if judges simply applied the ordinary rules of evidence in an even
handed manner, that would solve the problem. See id. A more recent study funded by the
Women Judges for Justice Project agrees. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 135 ("When battered
women are on trial, traditional concepts of criminal law continue to be discarded or oddly
twisted, and myths and misconceptions about battered women run rampant.").
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tific validity 22 But there is a solution: split the expert testimony
into its two valid component parts, social context and post-
traumatic stress disorder, and discard the (invalid) syndrome.
The impetus for battered woman syndrome testimony is the
insight that formal equality does not provide substantive equality
in the instance of battered women. Battered woman syndrome is
admissible to "aid the jury in determining whether a defendant's
fear and claim of self-defense are reasonable."226 The fact that
battered woman syndrome is scientifically unsound does not ne-
gate the importance of explaining the circumstances of battered
women in assessing the reasonableness of this woman's conduct.
The solution to this conundrum is two-fold. First, replace bat-
tered woman syndrome into its two--empirically sound-
component parts: social context evidence and post-traumatic
stress disorder evidence. Ditch the unreliable syndrome testi-
mony. Second, replace the imminence instruction-which is a
225. In traditional self-defense cases, battered woman syndrome testimony is admissible in
nearly every state. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 78 (noting that ninety percent of states admit
expert testimony on battering and its effects; nonetheless, "[many judges and lawyers fail to
understand that testimony by an expert should be used to support a battered woman's self-
defense or duress claim, not to replace it"). Despite the widespread admissibility of battered
women syndrome testimony in self-defense homicide cases, the expert testimony does not
appear to help defendants. See id. at 135 ("The defense's use of or the court's awareness
about expert testimony on battering and its effects in no way facilitates acquittal."). More-
over, even where battered woman syndrome testimony is admitted, convictions are over-
whelmingly achieved and affirmed. See generally Maguigan, Battered Women and Self
Defense, supra note 5. For example, in a case where battered woman syndrome testimony
was admitted and the defendant convicted of second degree murder, the appellate court af-
firmed the trial court's refusal to explain to the jury that "evidence of battered woman's syn-
drome could be used to gauge the reasonableness of her beliefs as they related to self-
defense" because the instruction given explained that the jury was to consider "whether de-
fendant 'reasonably believed a lesser degree of force was inadequate"' and whether she rea-
sonably believed herself to be in imminent danger. People v. Garcia, 1 P.3d 214, 222 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1999) (reversing and remanding for failure to instruct jury on provocation, absence
of a duty to retreat, and justifiable use of deadly force to prevent sexual assault but upholding
instruction on self-defense based on the trial court's instruction that "if you find that the
defendant did suffer from the syndrome, that is evidence which you can use in deciding the
issues" relating to self-defense). The defense argument was that without instruction, the jury
did not understand how to relate the battered woman syndrome testimony to self-defense.
See id.
226. State v. Edwards, No. WD 55243, 2000 WL 308872, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 28,
2000) (reversing conviction for inadequate jury instructions and acknowledging that "the
traditional concept of self-defense is based on one time conflicts between persons of some-
what equal size and strength, and that when the defendant is a victim of long-term domestic
violence suffering from battered spouse syndrome, such traditional concept does not apply").
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special case-with necessity-which is the foundational idea. The
reasons underlying the admissibility of battered woman syndrome
testimony are sound. The problem is that the syndrome itself
lacks empirical support. Replacing it with social context and
post-traumatic stress disorder evidence better meets the re-
quirement for scientifically valid evidence without discarding the
much-needed guidance relating to reasonableness of the accused's
conduct.
A. Social Context Evidence
Expert testimony about domestic violence is necessary and
helpful because in order to understand the abusive relationship
circumstances in which the accused found herself, two things are
needed: the particular relationship facts and the social, political
and economic contextual facts about domestic violence. Indeed,
most courts recognize this when admitting testimony about bat-
tering relationships.227 Relationship facts are the evidence of what
happened between the accused and the deceased, and that will be
provided by lay witnesses who were eyewitnesses to aspects of the
relationship. The social context testimony explains the common
social, political and economic circumstances of battered women as
a group." Educating jurors about the dynamics of battering rela-
tionships generally is important to help the jury to assess the rea-
sonableness of a woman acting in her situation.229
This kind of expert testimony about the circumstances of bat-
tered women is relevant to the objective reasonableness of the ac-
cused's conduct. As the Kelly court recognized, "external social
and economic factors often make it difficult for some women to
227. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 117 & n. 11l (citing cases). Although courts recognize
the importance of context, they do so primarily when admitting battered woman syndrome
testimony. The rationale for admitting social context evidence is the same, however, and it
should be similarly admissible.
228. See Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer, supra note 28, at 187 (advocating an ap-
proach "that holds battered women up to a common normative standard of healthy citizen
behavior, but seen in the context of the circumstances that battered women face generally and
that the particular battered woman faced specifically").
229. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way: The Role of Batterer's Profiles and Expert
"Social Framework" Background in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 147, 179 (1997) (explaining the importance of "statistics and general background in-
formation about the dynamics of battering").
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extricate themselves from battering relationships."23 The courts'
widespread admission of battered woman syndrome testimony
recognizes that the experience of battered women transcends the
particular woman's experience. Thus, it is as background infor-
mation to evaluate the reasonableness of her conduct-the cir-
cumstances of the case-that testimony about the experience of
battered women should be admitted.
Reasonableness can only be assessed in relation to common
experience. That is the function of the jury, to bring its common
understanding to bear on the facts of the case. However, if the
experience of battered women is not within the framework of the
jury's experience, it will have difficulty assessing the reasonable-
ness of her conduct. In order to understand the reasonableness of
a battered woman's beliefs and conduct, social context evidence is
imperative.' The accused did not act in a vacuum, but in con-
junction with pervasive overlapping social interests. Not only
must the perspective of the individual be presented as evidence,
but the perspective must be explained in terms of the common
experience of women in such situations."2 Social context evidence
is both essential to help the jury determine the reasonableness of
a defendant's belief and actions and to answer the jury's underly-
ing questions regarding credibility (if she was really battered why
did she stay?) and provocation."3  It also helps the jury under-
230. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984). Kelly involved the admissibility of
battered woman syndrome testimony in the self-defense claims of a battered woman who
stabbed her husband with scissors on the street as he ran toward her with his hands raised
shortly after an attack where he had choked her, punched her in the face, and bit her leg. The
court found expert testimony on battering to be admissible to show the objective reasonable-
ness of the accused's actions, and to dispel myths and misconceptions of the jury. Among
the myths and misconceptions that the court identified were "beliefs that they are masochistic
and actually enjoy their beatings, that they purposely provoke their husbands into violent
behavior, and, most critically... that women who remain in battering relationships are free
to leave their abusers at any time." Id. at 370. The court was also persuaded that testimony
about the psychological impact of the battering was important. Although the admissibility of
this information was accomplished via the battered woman syndrome, the reasoning of the
court is even more persuasive with respect to more scientifically valid social context and
post-traumatic stress disorder evidence.
231. See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 7, at 235 (explaining that the
perspective of a battered woman includes not only her own individual experience but a col-
lective experience as well) (citing State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977)).
232. See id. at 236 (emphasizing the "necessary interrelationship between the individual
and social perspective").
233. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 36-38.
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stand the accused's options, the necessity of her actions, and
whether her survival was really at stake when she killed her bat-
terer.
Social context evidence in the battered woman self-defense
case is relevant to the necessity and reasonableness of the ac-
cused's beliefs and conduct."4 Because information about batter-
ing relationships and the alternatives to a violent response are
not widely known, this information would enlighten rather than
confuse the jury."5 This kind of information is scientifically valid
expert testimony (providing the expert can meet the required va-
lidity inquiry). 6
Although I am arguing for the admissibility of a novel kind of
evidence for self-defense, it is not altogether without precedent.
First, social context evidence has been a component of battered
woman syndrome testimony from the start. 7 Expert testimony
about the general social context of a witness's perceptions is cur-
rently admissible in many different guises.231 It is admissible, for
example, to impeach eyewitness testimony. 9 The use of general
234. That is, the information about the experience of battered women pertains to a fact of
consequence in the litigation, i.e., the reasonableness of the accused's beliefs and conduct,
and it renders that reasonableness more probable (or less probable) than it would be without
the expert testimony. See FED. R. EviD. 402.
235. The prohibition against undue prejudice articulated in FED. R. EVID. 403 reflects a
concern that the factfinder not be swayed from a dispassionate inquiry into the facts by ex-
treme horror (or sympathy) which increases a desire to punish the offender. See 10 JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 403.10[1] (2d ed. 1985). Expert social
science testimony hardly falls into this category. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 12, at
575-76 & n. 48 (observing that "To our knowledge, the charge of playing on the jurors'
emotions has never been leveled against the introduction of a social framework" and noting
that the paradigmatic example of undue prejudice is grisly photographic evidence of the
crime). Further, any over-valuing of scientific expert testimony by the jury has been empiri-
cally disproven. See id. at 577 (noting that juries "strongly tend to give less weight to the
framework than the logic of inference suggests is due").
236. That is, social science research in general has an empirical basis that can at least in
theory meet a Daubert inquiry. Whether the particular evidence adduced in a specific trial
can meet such a standard must be determined in each case.
237. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 364 (N.J. 1984). (admitting battered woman syn-
drome testimony not only as testimony about psychological impacts of battering, but also
about the social and economic impacts, and to dispel myths and misconceptions of the jury),
238. This is what some commentators label Asocial framework" evidence. See, e.g.,
Walker & Monahan, supra note 12, at 559.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting a 'juris-
dictional trend" toward admitting expert testimony pertaining to eyewitness accuracy);
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observations drawn from social science to determine factual issues
in a specific case is helpful to the jury because it brings to the
jury's attention factors beyond common knowledge.'
Social context evidence provides the jury with background in-
formation to help the jury assess claims about reasonableness. 1
The evidentiary basis on which such testimony is relevant is the
same as that of syndrome testimony: to "explain why the abuse a
woman suffered causes her to reasonably believe that her life is in
danger and that she must use deadly force to escape her bat-
terer." 42 This information is beyond the ken of most people,
judges and juries alike.
Judges and juries treat domestic violence as a rare aberra-
tion. 3  Yet, American families are violent places.' "[Flor the
typical American woman, her home is the location where there is
the most serious risk of assault." 5 And leaving is not the answer
because separation is fraught with danger. 6 Thus, a history of
United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp. 2d 62, 72 (D. Mass. 1999) (admitting expert testimony on
the reliability of eyewitness testimony).
240. Many courts acknowledge the admissibility of general social context evidence when
they are admitting battered woman syndrome testimony. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hall,
696 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998) (admitting battered woman syndrome testimony
not as "a diagnosis or an illness" but to explain the reasonableness of the accused's percep-
tion of threat).
241. See Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social
Framework Testimony, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 133, 135 (1989) (assessing the helpfulness
and prejudicial impact of social context evidence and concluding that there is no conceptual
problem limiting its admissibility).
242. People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 219 (I11. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining the basis for
admissibility of battered woman syndrome testimony).
243. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 10-11 (noting that "judicial opinions ... treat domes-
tic violence as aberrant and unusual" despite statistics showing violence against women is "a
relatively widespread phenomenon in our society").
244. See generally PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND
ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIS (Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles eds.,
1992) (reporting the results of two surveys conducted ten years apart).
245. See id. at 98 (reporting that the rates of husband-wife assault are "many times the
female assault victimization rate outside the family" and that although women are seldom
murder victims outside the family-twenty-one percent of stranger homicide victims--they
represent seventy-six percent of spouse murder victims). Moreover, even if women initiate
violence as often as men, they are more likely to sustain physical injury than men. See id. at
163.
246. See Mahoney, supra note 12, at 64-65 (arguing that the concept of the battered
woman should be replaced with "separation assault," defined as "the attack on the woman's
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past domestic violence ought to be admissible, not in the guise of
flawed battered woman syndrome testimony, but in the guise as a
way of putting the reasonableness of the accused's actions in con-
text. 7 For example, social context evidence may be key to ex-
plaining why a woman would be trapped in a violent situation and
why being trapped in such a way was not a defect on her part.'
Women may be trapped, not psychologically, but physically and
economically, in an abusive relationship. Also, they may have
children that their flight would put in danger. 9
Explaining the circumstances that made a particular action
reasonable is important to any objective system of justice." °
Moreover, the standard for self-defense in most jurisdictions re-
quires a reasonable belief in the necessity of deadly force. Unless
the factfinder is apprized of the circumstances, making a reason-
ableness determination is virtually impossible.25" '
In addition, many juries and judges have difficulty believing
a woman's claims of abuse because they fail to understand why, if
she was abused, she did not just leave. The inference is that she
must be exaggerating the claims of abuse in retrospect because no
reasonable person would subject herself to repeated violence.
Evidence about what happens to battered women who attempt to
leave an abusive partner would help dispel this misconception. 2
body and volition in which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the
separation, or force her to return").
247. See Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 229, at 147 (addressing the misuse of battered
woman syndrome testimony as a conduit for teaching the jury about the dynamics of domes-
tic violence).
248. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 79 (advocating the use of expert testimony to "inform the
factfinder about the social context in which the incident occurred").
249. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect
Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 235 (1996).
250. Cf. Parrish, supra note 4, at 79-80 (explaining that social context information is com-
monly admissible in male-on-male violence cases and thus is not unique to battered
women's self-defense claims).
251. Thus, in Louisiana, for example, the evidentiary provisions for the admissibility of
character evidence provide that a defendant in a domestic violence situation may introduce
expert testimony "as to the effects of the prior assaultive acts on the accused's state of mind."
State v. Carter, 762 So. 2d 662, 678 & n.2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000) (affirming the conviction
of a battered wife based on, among other things, the trial court's admitting of the defendant's
social scientist expert to testify generally about domestic violence and specifically that it was
her opinion that the defendant feared for her life on the night she shot her husband).
252. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 10-13.
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Further, self-defense requires the defendant to make use of avail-
able legal protection (why did she stay in an abusive relationship,
and why did she fail to call the police before resorting to vio-
lence?). The answers to these questions may have much more to
do with the social realities of her alternatives-which also must
be demonstrated empirically (that is, by way of expert testi-
mony)-as it has to do with any impairment to her cognitive func-
tions from the trauma.
In other words, for the jury to evaluate the reasonableness of
the defendant's actions, some chilling facts may need to be
brought to the court's attention in a battered spouse case. Al-
though domestic violence constitutes the largest category of calls
police receive, police are notoriously reluctant to respond to such
calls, and when they do, only ten to eighteen percent of the abus-
ers are arrested, despite grounds for arrest in fifty percent of the
cases." Arrest of the abuser frequently results in increased vio-
lence toward the woman."' Shelters are often either unavailable
or unsafe. 5 Police, district attorneys, and judges all frequently
attempt to dissuade victims from proceeding with criminal
charges."5 Judges often blame the victim, presuming provocation,
and often fail to believe women without visible injuries. 27 Inter-
estingly enough, women who kill a spouse are much more likely to
be charged with murder than men who kill their wives-usually
charged with manslaughter-and women's charges are much less
likely to be reduced (eighteen versus forty-seven percent). 8 Bat-
terers are rarely charged with felonies, and sentences tend to be
lenient. 9  In other words, in light of the high percentage of
women who are murdered by their former partners after they
253. See generally Dutton, supra note 219, at 1211-14. Perhaps because of this reluctance
on the part of the police to respond to calls involving domestic violence and the paucity of
arrests, studies estimate that only ten percent of domestic violence incidents are ever reported
to the police.
254. Id. at 1212.
255. See Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POL'Y
237, 249-50 (1994).
256. See id. at 245-48.
257. See Lynn H. Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063,
1063-67 (1995) (describing the attitudes of judges toward male domestic violence against
women).
258. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 141.
259. Id. at 134.
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leave abusive relationships, economic pressures, and the ineffec-
tiveness of police intervention, leaving may simply not be an op-
tion." The most recent studies indicate that women are killed by
intimates far more often than men.261
Without social context evidence, the jury will continue to
struggle with their preconceptions and with the male paradigm in
which the criminal law is cast. The point is that the wrong evi-
dence (battered woman syndrome testimony) is coming in and
even where the more useful (and reliable) social context evidence
is admitted, its significance is not sufficiently brought home to the
jury.
Domestic violence, although arguably widespread, is not
something within the jury's common experience." 2 In order to un-
derstand the reasonableness of the accused's actions, the fact-
finder will need to know the circumstances in which the accused
found herself at the time of the attack. Therefore, when the cir-
cumstances include a history of domestic violence, the jury may
need the assistance of an expert.
Simply bringing the social context into court through expert
testimony is not enough, however. The court must properly in-
struct the jury on its significance, bringing the factual elements to
bear on the legal requirements for self-defense.2" Otherwise, thejury will continue to struggle with their preconceptions and with
the male paradigm in which the criminal law is cast. That judges
and juries fail to comprehend the significance of domestic violence
to the elements of self-defense is clear in the statistics regarding
case dispositions on appeal. Sixty-three percent of convicted bat-
tered women defendant's appeals are affirmed on appeal in state
260. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1344-45 (1997) (noting a high percentage of incidents in her
research in which the relationship was over, ending, or in which the victim sought to leave).
261. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DoMESTIC VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE BETWEEN
INTIMATES 3 (1994); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 6 (1994).
262. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 12, at 10-13 (citing widespread denial of domestic
violence); People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 920 (1992) (reversing exclusion of expert
testimony on domestic violence because "[s]uch evidence would have assisted the jury in
objectively analyzing appellant's claim of self-defense by dispelling many commonly held
misconceptions about battered woman syndrome").
263. See, e.g., Walker & Monahan, supra note 12, at 595-96, 597 & n.124 (emphasizing
the importance of jury instructions where eyewitness social science testimony is involved).
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courts despite the admissibility of expert testimony in seventy-
one percent of the affirmances.' The point is that the wrong evi-
dence (battered woman syndrome testimony) is coming in and
even where the more useful (and reliable) social context evidence
is admitted, instructions are so confusing that the jury struggles
with its significance.
Expert testimony about domestic violence is necessary and
helpful because to understand the abusive relationship circum-
stances in which the accused found herself, two things are needed:
the particular relationship facts and the social, political and eco-
nomic contextual facts about domestic violence. Indeed, most
courts recognize this when admitting testimony about battering
relationships.265 Relationship facts are the evidence of what hap-
pened between the accused and the deceased and will be provided
by lay witnesses who were eyewitnesses to aspects of the relation-
ship. The social context testimony explains the common social,
political, and economic circumstances of battered women as a
group."' Educating jurors about the dynamics of battering rela-
tionships generally is important for their understanding of the
specific relationship dynamics that the accused experienced.
267
B. Psychological Impact Evidence
Because of the lack of support for battered woman syndrome
testimony, it should not be used-as many courts use it-to dem-
onstrate the psychological impact of battering. Normally, state of
mind evidence is an excuse defense rather than a justification
(like self-defense). Although courts frequently discuss battered
264. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 86 (observing that "expert testimony on battering and its
effects in no way equates to an acquittal" and finding an even greater affirmance rate in fed-
eral courts).
265. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 117, 118 n.I 11. Although courts recognize the impor-
tance of context, they do so primarily when admitting battered woman syndrome testimony.
The rationale for admitting social context evidence is the same, however, and it should be
similarly admissible.
266. See Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer, supra note 28, at 187 (advocating an ap-
proach "that holds battered women up to a common normative standard of healthy citizen
behavior, but seen in the context of the circumstances that battered women face generally and
that the particular battered woman faced specifically").
267. See Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 229, at 179 (explaining the importance of
"statistics and general background information about the dynamics of battering").
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woman syndrome as affecting the accused's state of mind,2"8 they
normally admit battered woman syndrome testimony as justifica-
tion rather than excuse testimony. That is, battered woman syn-
drome testimony is usually offered to demonstrate honesty and
reasonableness of her belief in the necessity of using deadly force,
rather than to show that the defendant suffered from an illness
that would diminish her responsibility."'
Many courts acknowledge that battered women may suffer
from PTSD, and many experts that testify about battered woman
syndrome attempt to characterize it-inaccurately-as a sub-
species of PTSD.270  PTSD is a disease known to afflict people-
including women subjected to domestic violence-who have been
threatened with death or who have suffered severe bodily harm."1
PTSD is a type of sensory gating defect, in which sensory input is
not filtered in a normal way.27 ' As a result, people suffering with
this disorder tend to respond to perceived events in an exagger-
ated manner."' This disorder arises when someone has experi-
enced or witnessed an event involving death or severe injury, and
is characterized by a number of symptoms.27 First, there is
avoidance of anything that reminds the sufferer of the original
trauma.275 Second, the person suffering this disorder will experi-
ence hyperarousal, that is, an increased fight or flight response.276
268. See, e.g., Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377 (finding battered woman syndrome testimony admis-
sible on the "crucial issue of fact.., why, given such allegedly severe and constant beatings,
combined with threats to kill, defendant had not long ago left decedent" and to show the
psychological impact of battering-the honesty of her belief in imminent danger of death).
269. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hall, 696 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998) (admit-
ting battered woman syndrome testimony not as "a diagnosis or an illness" but to explain the
reasonableness of the accused's perception of threat); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1992) (noting that battered woman syndrome is not a "mental disease").
270. See, e.g., State v. Hines, 696 A.2d 780, 782 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (finding
exclusion of expert testimony regarding PTSD reversible error where deceased father had
history of sexually assaulting his accused daughter because it was necessary "to explain why
defendant believed that the victim intended to rape her and that she needed to use force to
avoid his assault").
271. See generally DSM IV, supra note 223.
272. See id. at 428-29; see also Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Gatekeeping
Stress: The Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Evidence (manuscript on file
with author).
273. See DSM IV, supra note 223, at 428-29.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
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Third, persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event, which
triggers increased arousal (fight or flight), and causes all the
physical, emotional, and psychological responses that were ex-
perienced in the first traumatic event.277
Post-traumatic stress disorder has been well researched,
published, peer-reviewed, subjected to critique and error analysis
and meets standards of general consensus. Whether it is relevant
in any case depends upon its nexus with the facts, such as
whether the accused exhibited such symptoms. In the appropri-
ate case where the accused has been diagnosed as suffering from
PTSD, it may be appropriate to show the honesty of the accused's
belief, a component of self-defense.
Evidence that a woman is suffering from PTSD as a result of
the trauma of abuse may indeed be relevant to her conduct. It can
explain why she reacted to a particular situation the way she did
(the increased fight-or-flight response may help to explain why
she used more force than appears necessary, for example, or the
re-experiencing phenomenon may explain why she killed during a
lull in the fighting). Not all abused killers suffer from PTSD, but
if statistics showing that sixty percent of rape victims suffer from
it are anywhere close for battered women, a large percentage of
them do. PTSD testimony should be available to them to explain
their conduct.
As a brain dysfunction characterized by a particular set of
symptoms, PTSD ought to be admissible whenever mental state is
at issue. The disadvantage of this approach is that it relegates
PTSD testimony in homicide cases to the category of excuse,
rather than justification, and perpetuates the myth of battered
women as sick. There may well be times when a domestic vio-
lence victim who has retaliated against her mate in self-defense
suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. And in those circum-
stances, it may well be that her heightened arousal symptoms
from the PTSD caused her to perceive a minor threat as a major
one. In those circumstances, if she can show that she suffers from
PTSD, such a defense ought to be available to her.278 On the other
277. See DSM IV, supra note 223, at 428-29.
278. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 740 A.2d 726, 733-34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that
expert testimony about PTSD stemming from having a gun pointed at him during previous
2001]
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hand, it may well be that the threat she perceived really was a
major threat to her survival because of the social context in which
she lived. In that event, it is the social context evidence that will
explain her circumstances rather than the PTSD.
VI. CONCLUSION
Neither formal equality goals nor substantive equality goals
are met by the way domestic violence is currently handled in the
courts. Evidence that would describe the violent situations that
women find themselves in-the kind of evidence that is routinely
admissible in male-to-male violence-is frequently excluded.
Syndrome evidence, on the other hand, that would be excluded
under normal evidentiary analysis of its scientific validity, is rou-
tinely admissible. As a result, women who have been victimized
by domestic violence are further victimized by the courts' mishan-
dling of the evidence that would tell their story.
The increased empiricism demanded by the Supreme Court's
transformative trilogy of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire may
offer a way out of this conundrum in three ways. First, excluding
the bogus science of battered woman syndrome restores the em-
pirical basis for evidence presented to the factfinder. Second, so-
cial context evidence about domestic violence educates the jury
about the reasonableness of the defendant's response to danger
and dispels prevalent misconceptions about the possibility of es-
cape and the battered woman's responsibility for provoking her
abuse. Third, in those cases in which the defendant also suffers
from PTSD, expert testimony about the defendant's condition may
help explain her actions. This perspective transcends the debate
over formal and substantive equality by offering a way of incorpo-
rating the concerns and insights of both, while accommodating the
need for greater empiricism in the quest of providing justice for
all.
robberies is relevant to show the accused acted in self-defense in a road-rage case where the
accused fired his gun at a driver who had shouted profanities at him).
136 [Vol. 47
